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ABSTRACT 
One of the most significant trends in the evolution of global tax systems has been the rise from 
relative obscurity of thin capitalisation rules, which are perceived as anti-avoidance rules which limit 
tax base erosion from cross-border interest deductions. However, over the same timeframe, 
innovations to financial instruments have challenged the traditional financial and legal distinctions 
between debt and equity, which in the cross-border setting has exposed the prevalence of economic 
inefficiencies in the design of the international tax system. 
This paper approaches the issue of thin capitalisation from a novel perspective by conceptualising the 
cross-border debt bias as the ‘disease’ and thin capitalisation as merely the ‘symptom’. Despite their 
prevalence, it is unclear whether thin capitalisation rules: (1) attain tax neutrality (specifically, do 
these rules mitigate the debt bias); (2) are effective in both theory and practice.  
This provides the basis to examine whether a cross-border manifestation of a fundamental reform 
could eliminate the need for existing thin capitalisation rules, which are presently a second-best 
solution to the tax-induced cross-border debt bias. Accordingly, this paper: (1) considers reforms 
traditionally designed to address the domestic debt bias; specifically, the allowance for corporate 
equity (ACE), comprehensive business income tax (CBIT), combined ACE-CBIT and allowance for 
corporate capital; (2) examines the literature and implementation experience of the ACE, the only one 
of these fundamental reforms which has been experimented with in practice, to consider whether it is 
effective in both theory and practice; (3) presents the possibility of extending the combined ACE-
CBIT to the cross-border context as an alternative to thin capitalisation rules. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper approaches the issue of thin capitalisation from a novel perspective by conceptualising the 
cross-border debt bias as the ‘disease’ and thin capitalisation as merely the ‘symptom’. The 
overarching question guiding this paper is whether, given the opportunity to ‘start over’, the tax-
induced cross-border debt bias would be better addressed by retaining thin capitalisation rules in their 
current form or whether an alternative reform would be more suited to dealing with this ‘disease’. 
The cross-border tax-induced debt bias incentivises MNEs to finance their high-tax jurisdiction 
affiliates with excessive debt, thereby reducing their tax liability in those jurisdictions. International 
debt shifting through this phenomenon of ‘hidden equity capitalisation’ (or ‘thin capitalisation’) lies at 
the core of (aggressive) international tax planning. Currently, tax authorities address tax revenue base 
erosion by restricting interest relief in cross-border financial transactions by MNEs. This is achieved 
through provisions such as ‘thin capitalisation rules’. Thin capitalisation rules seek to prevent the 
erosion of the tax revenue base and seem to have reduced debt ratios. However, leading commentators 
approach these results sceptically, suggesting that rather than mitigating the debt bias, these rules 
simply encourage levels of debt at the specified threshold debt-equity ratios. 
Of course, in the absence of international tax coordination, full tax neutrality cannot be obtained, as 
tax rates and systems will still differ. However, it is still possible to encourage neutrality between 
equity and debt financing from a tax point of view (‘funding neutrality’) as a second-best solution. 
Funding neutrality may be achieved by implementing fundamental reforms designed to address the 
debt bias by equalising the tax treatment of debt and equity financing. 
Accordingly, section 2 begins by observing that thin capitalisation legislation merely targets the 
‘symptom’ of debt shifting, rather than the underlying ‘disease’ of the tax-induced cross-border debt 
bias. This section examines the background, practice and issues in practice associated with thin 
capitalisation rules. In particular, highlighting the thin capitalisation rules’ departures from good tax 
design and examining the literature that challenging the assumption that these rules mitigate the debt 
bias. This is supplemented by empirical evidence which suggests that thin capitalisation rules 
considerably complicate corporate tax systems, reduce investment, are usually ad-hoc and not well 
targeted, and are often avoided by MNEs that can exploit hybrid instruments and international 
differences in definitions of debt and equity. 
Section 3 of this paper considers reforms traditionally designed to address the domestic debt bias; 
specifically, the allowance for corporate equity (ACE), comprehensive business income tax (CBIT), 
combined ACE-CBIT and allowance for corporate capital (ACC). The focus of this section is on 
examining the literature and implementation experience of the ACE, which is the only fundamental 
reform to have been experimented with in practice. This section also presents the possibility of 
implementing a combined ACE-CBIT in the cross-border context as an alternative to thin 
capitalisation rules. 
Finally, section 4 summarises the findings of this paper and includes areas for further research. 
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2 THIN CAPITALISATION RULES: ADDRESSING 
DOMESTIC TAX REVENUE BASE EROSION 
2.1 BACKGROUND 
Even though the cross-border issue cannot be isolated from the rest of the tax system,
1
 the focus of 
this paper is the cross-border debt bias because the debt bias is most problematic in this context. The 
tax-induced cross-border debt bias incentivises behavioural responses to take advantage of the 
international classification differences between debt and equity,
2
 and distorts multinational enterprises 
(‘MNEs’) corporate financing decisions. 
MNEs are clearly at an advantage, with access to global debt and equity markets; various 
jurisdictions’ tax rates; and, various tax systems in general. In the absence of international tax 
coordination, these opportunities are nearly impossible to eliminate. On the other hand, policymakers 
are increasingly faced with the competing objectives of remaining internationally competitive and 
encouraging foreign investment while also maintaining the integrity of their national tax bases.  
Thin capitalisation rules arose from governments’ concerns regarding tax base erosion and are one 
species of a plethora of various legislative rules restricting cross-border interest deductibility.
3
 These 
rules’ strong emphasis on revenue base protection has resulted in an exponentially increasing 
popularity internationally,
4
 as shown in Figure 1 below: 
Figure 1 
 
However, it is necessary to make a two-fold clarification. First, no two thin capitalisation regimes are 
the same. Second, the term ‘thin capitalisation’ itself is not an exact legal term, rather it has both a 
narrow and a broad meaning. The narrow definition of thin capitalisation relates to the excessive use 
of debt financing compared to equity financing (or asset bases).
5
 On the other hand, the broad 
                                                          
1 Grubert H and Altshuler R, ‘Corporate Taxes in the World Economy: Reforming the Taxation of Cross-Border Income’, in: 
Diamond J and Zodrow G (eds.) Fundamental Tax Reform: Issues, Choices, and Implications (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2008), 319–321.  
2 Desai MA, Testimony before the US Senate Committee on Finance and the US House Committee on Ways and Means (13 
July 2011); available at: http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DesaiTestimonyFinal.pdf, 4. 
3 A full synthesis of all cross-border restrictions on interest deductibility is beyond the scope of this paper; however, a 
starting point is Dourado A and de la Feria R, ‘Thin Capitalization Rules in the Context of the CCCTB’ (Working Paper 
08/04, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, 2008). 
4 Blouin et al observe that 27 out of 54 countries sampled had implemented specific thin capitalisation rules: Blouin J, 
Huizinga H, Laeven L and G Nicodème, ‘Thin Capitalization Rules and Multinational Firm Capital Structure’ (IMF 
Working Paper WP/14/12, January 2014), 7. Within a decade, this increased to 42 of the 54 countries sampled. 
5 In this context, thin capitalisation rules places formal restrictions on the deductibility of interest paid by MNEs, with the 
portion that is deemed ‘excessive’ being disallowed or, in some cases, requalified as dividends. This is aimed at MNEs 
using, for example, internal debt as a means to shift profits from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions: see Helminen M, 
4 
definition casts a wider net to also include hybrid financing.
6
 The literature has given relatively little 
attention to the implications on the effectiveness of thin capitalisation rules due to the advent of 
hybrid financing.
7
 Studies that do exist focus on the European context and make no mention of 
jurisdictions such as Australia.
8
  
Even though some empirical findings point to Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (‘BEPS’) declining 
over the past decade,
9
 leading to scepticism regarding the OECD’s current focus on the BEPS 
project,
10
 the OECD’s focus on transfer pricing11 reflects policymakers and other leading academics’ 
concern.
12
 Indeed, the OECD is currently developing best practice recommendations for the design of 
thin capitalisation rules through Action 4 of its BEPS project, expected to be made available by late-
2015.
13
 This is almost 3 decades in the making. By way of background, the most recent OECD report 
on thin capitalisation rules was published in 1986
14
 and omitted guidance on how thin capitalisation 
rules could best be designed.
15
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
International Tax Law Concept of Dividend: Issue 36 of Series on international taxation, (Great Britain: Kluwer Law 
International, 2010)., 321–322, and footnotes cited therein; see also; Arnold B, ‘General Report: Deductibility of Interest and 
Other Financing Charges in Computing Income’, in: International Fiscal Association, Deductibility of interest and other 
financing charges in computing income, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, 79a (Toronto, Canada: Kluwer Law 
International, 1994) 491, 512; Piltz D, General Report in Cahiers De Droit Fiscal International: International Aspects of 
Thin Capitalisation (1996) XXXIb International Fiscal Association, Geneva Congress, 89. 
6 Hybrid financing presents a fundamental challenge to traditional corporate financing principles because in practice it is 
becoming increasingly difficult for governments to classify financial instruments, as many have some of the traditional 
elements of both debt and equity: see Lüthi D, ‘Thin capitalisation of companies in international tax law’ (1991) 19(10) 
Intertax 446, 447. The economics literature assumes that corporate debt shields are limited in practice due to the associated 
default risk from excess leverage. Further, when focusing on intra-group debt and equity ﬁnancing, bilateral double tax 
conventions are usually effective for tax harmonisation purposes. However, if debt and equity are merely tax-related labels, 
then this is no longer a valid assumption: Shaviro DN, ‘Simplifying Assumptions: How Might the Politics of Consumption 
Tax Reform Affect (Impair) the End Product?’, in: Diamond J and Zodrow G (eds.) Fundamental Tax Reform: Issues, 
Choices, and Implications (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008) 75–124, 98. Due to the advent of financial engineering, it is 
possible to separate tax labels from economic substance, thereby giving a corporate financial instrument a specific tax 
characteristic while simultaneously and independently manufacturing a particular set of economic relationships between the 
investors: see further, Devereux, 518; Aschauer E, Eberhartinger E, Panny W, ‘Cross-border hybrid finance and tax 
planning: does international coordination work?’, in: Zagler M (ed.), International Tax Coordination - An interdisciplinary 
perspective on virtues and pitfalls (New York: Routledge, 2010), 115-133; Klostermann M, ‘The Consequences of Hybrid 
Finance in Thin Capitalization Situations: An Analysis of the Substantive Scope of National Thin Capitalization Rules with 
special Emphasis on Hybrid Financial Instruments’ (Discussion Papers SFB International Tax Coordination No 22, WU 
Vienna University of Economics and Business, July 2007); Sørensen PB and Johnson S, Chapter 9: Taxing Capital Income 
– Options for Reform in Australia, Melbourne Institute, Australia’s Future Tax and Transfer Policy Conference, June 2009, 
203. 
7 Although leading commentators such as Aschauer et al have extensively examined hybrid finance, thin capitalisation rules 
are specifically excluded from the scope of their paper: Aschauer et al, above n 6, 115-133. 
8 Klostermann, above n 6. 
9 Dharmapala D, ‘What Do We Know About Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A Review of the Empirical Literature’ 
(Illinois Public Law Research Paper No 14-23, 15 June 2014). 
10 Lohse T and Riedel N, ‘Do Transfer Pricing Laws Limit International Income Shifting? Evidence from European 
Multinationals’ (CESifo Working Paper No 4404, September 2012). 
11 Burnett C, ‘Intra-Group Debt at the Crossroads: Stand-Alone versus Worldwide Approach’ (2014) 6(1) World Tax Journal 
(27 January 2014). 
12 Traversa E, ‘Interest Deductibility and the BEPS Action Plan: nihil novi sub sole?’ [2013] 5 British Tax Review 607. 
13 The Public Discussion Draft was released on 18 December 2014, with the Public Consultation meeting scheduled for 17 
February 2015: see OECD, Public Discussion Draft, BEPS Action 4: Interest deductions and other financial payments, 18 
December 2014 – 6 February 2015, available at: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/aggressive/discussion-draft-action-4-interest-
deductions.pdf; see further: Blouin J, Huizinga H, Laeven L and Nicodème G, Thin capitalisation rules and corporate 
leverage (29 March 2014) Vox EU; available at: http://www.voxeu.org/article/thin-capitalisation-rules-and-corporate-
leverage. 
14 OECD, Report on “Thin Capitalisation” (OECD 1986), adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 26 
November 1986 (the ‘Thin Capitalisation Report’); Similarly, the OECD’s survey of thin capitalisation regimes currently 
remains in draft form only, with no indication of when it will be finalised: OECD, Thin capitalisation legislation a 
background paper for country tax administrations, draft paper, available at: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-
global/5.%20Thin_Capitalization_Background.pdf. 
15 Traversa, above n 12. 
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2.2 PRACTICE – AND ISSUES IN PRACTICE 
To assess the effectiveness of thin capitalisation rules it is necessary to examine these rules in both 
theory and practice. This paper will focus in particular on issues in practice; specifically, balancing 
competing policy objectives and weaknesses in legal design. 
 
2.2.1 Departures from good tax design 
Over the past two decades, innovations to cross-border financing by MNEs has challenged the 
traditional financial and legal distinctions between debt and equity, putting into question the 
robustness of the international tax system, including the thin capitalisation framework. Each 
jurisdiction’s aspiration to protect their own national tax base from debt shifting by MNEs is the 
raison d’être of thin capitalisation rules. For example, Australia’s explanatory materials to its thin 
capitalisation legislation clearly state these rules are in place “to prevent the excessive allocation of 
debt for tax purposes”.16 
Australia’s thin capitalisation rules aim to balance three-fold tax policy considerations in setting the 
relevant debt limits, specifically:
17
 first, “minimising unnecessary compliance costs for 
multinationals” (simplicity and transparency); second, “ensuring that the debt limits do not impede 
the efficient allocation of capital” (efficiency); and third, “maintaining the integrity of the revenue 
base” (sustainability). However, the artificial caps and ratios that typify thin capitalisation rules 
arguably conflict with both simplicity and efficiency concerns.
18
 The latter is the focus of this paper 
because unlike departures from simplicity, which adversely affect compliance and administrative 
costs, “departures from neutrality … are some of the principal building blocks which so-called ‘tax 
planners’ use to erect schemes of (legal) tax avoidance, often of a highly artificial kind”.19 
2.2.1.1.1 Efficiency 
The economic efficiency benchmark criteria for company taxation is synthesised by leading academic 
Warren, as shown in Figure 2 below.
20
 
                                                          
16 Explanatory Memorandum, Tax and Superannuation Laws Amendment (2014 Measures No 4) Bill 2014 (Cth), 4. 
17 Explanatory Memorandum, above n 16, 4. 
18 Webber S, ‘Thin Capitalization and Interest Deduction Rules: A Worldwide Survey’ Tax Notes International: Special 
Report (29 November 2010) 683, 703. 
19 At the centre of public finance analysis is the topic of distortions introduced (and corrected) by taxation. Tax-induced 
reductions in economic efficiency are known as deadweight losses or excess burdens of taxation, signifying the cost to 
taxpayers and society of raising revenue through taxes that distort economic decision. The tax neutrality principle states that 
tax systems should strive to be neutral such that decisions are made on their economic merits, rather than for tax reasons. 
“Departures from neutrality, whether in the form of concessions or lack of alignment between different taxes, are some of the 
principal building blocks which so-called ‘tax planners’ use to erect schemes of (legal) tax avoidance, often of a highly 
artificial kind … The opportunities for practices of this kind are of concern not only because they do damage to the equity of 
the system, and the attitudes of other taxpayers to compliance with it, in that certain taxpayers (more predominantly the 
relatively well-to-do ones) reduce their tax relative to others” Taxation Reforms: Problems and Aims, Treasury Taxation 
Paper No 1, 1974; see further, Auerbach AJ and Hines JR, ‘Taxation and Economic Efficiency’ (NBER Working Paper No 
8181, National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2001). 
20 Warren NA (eds), ‘Modelling the economic outcomes from TVM: is it practical and meaningful’, in Tax Value Method 
Consultative Conference (presented at Tax Value Method Consultative Conference, Coogee Beach, Sydney, 23-24 July 
2001), 197-215. 
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Figure 2 
Economic Efficiency 
Criteria Description 
1 Funding neutrality Do not distort the decision on how to fund a business (eg debt vs equity) 
2 Risk neutrality Permits risk offset and adjustment 
3 Business structure neutrality Incorporated and unincorporated companies treated similarly 
4 Net Income neutrality Neutral in its treatment of different income and expenditure sources and asset and 
liability types 
5 Payout neutrality Neutral between dividends and retentions; and  
neutral in its impact on financial innovation (bifurcation vs aggregation)  
6 Taxpayer neutrality Incentives to different groups should result in the same outcome for individuals 
whatever structure is invested in 
7 Capital import/export neutrality Benefit to resident and offshore investors should be similar.  
8 Institutional neutrality No prejudice or favour by government to sectors or groups (and if so, any market 
intervention should be efficiently targeted, transparent and costed). 
Regarding the neutrality of cross-border capital income taxation, the theoretical literature 
predominantly focusses on capital import neutrality (‘CIN’),21 capital export neutrality (‘CEN’) 22 and 
capital ownership neutrality (‘CON’).23 However, these neutrality benchmarks have received 
substantial criticism in the literature. Notably, leading commentators such as Graetz, Shaviro, and 
Grubert and Altshuler posit that none of these benchmarks are satisfactory because the arguments 
supporting them usually take place within very simple models.
24
 Some commentators argue that 
neutrality should evolve beyond the CEN and CIN debate to instead focus on global optimality and 
production efficiency.
25
 
Despite the prevalence of commentators such as Shaheen
26
 detailing international tax neutrality 
considerations, the literature remains largely silent on the absence of funding neutrality in the design 
of thin capitalisation rules. There is no compelling reason why debt should be actively tax-favoured. 
Although thin capitalisation rules deny ‘excessive’ interest deductions, they are essentially ad hoc, 
                                                          
21 Capital import neutrality requires that domestic and foreign investors receive the same after-tax rate of return on similar 
investments in that market. It aims for neutrality in international savings decisions and is embodied in a territorial or source-
based tax system; see further, Gravelle JG, ‘Reform of U.S. International Taxation: Alternatives’ (Congressional Research 
Service, Report No. RL34115, 27 December 2012), 5. 
22 Capital export neutrality requires that investors in a country are subject to the same effective tax rate on income from 
domestic investment and income from foreign investment, such that the allocation of investments between countries is 
unaffected by tax considerations. It is embodied in a residence-based tax system; see further, Gravelle, above n 21, 5. 
23 Capital ownership neutrality requires that countries not tax the offshore investments of resident companies, focussing 
instead on taxing domestic source income tax systems.  It is neutral towards asset ownership on a worldwide basis and 
achieving it would be consistent with CIN; see further, Desai MA and Hines JR, ‘Evaluating International Tax Reform’ 
(2003) 56(3) National Tax Journal 487. 
24 Grubert and Altshuler, above n 1, 320 and 331–333; see further, Graetz MJ, ‘Taxing International Income: Inadequate 
Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies’ (2001) 54 Tax Law Review 261, 280–282 [observing that 
increasing worldwide welfare does not necessarily increase national welfare in the case of international tax policy, thereby 
supporting national welfare, rather than worldwide efficiency, as a policy goal]; Shaviro D, ‘Why Worldwide Welfare as a 
Normative Standard in U.S. Tax Policy?’ (2007) 60 Tax Law Review 155, 164–65 [contending that, even if worldwide 
welfare improves national welfare by encouraging cooperative behaviour, unobserved defections should improve national 
welfare]. 
25 Devereux MP, ‘Taxation of Outbound Direct Investment: Economic Principles and Tax Policy Considerations’ (Oxford 
University Centre for Business Taxation Working Papers No 02/24, September 2008); Diamond and Mirrlees’ production 
efficiency theorem provides a rationale for a neutral tax system. This theorem states that, in a competitive economy, an 
optimal tax structure is characterised by production efficiency so long as all economic activities, and any pure profits, can be 
taxed. Importantly, production efficiency cannot be achieved by residence- or source-based taxes unless they are fully 
harmonized because the Diamond and Mirrlees theorem was derived for a closed economy with a single government budget 
constraint, see further: Nicodème GJA, ‘Corporate Income Tax and Economic Distortions’ (CESifo Working Paper Series 
No 2477, CESifo Group Munich, 2008). However, in the absence of international agreement, the question then is which 
system (source-based or residence-based) generates greater welfare costs. However, leading commentators observe that 
decisions of location involve the choice between cross-border investment and trade so any argument in favour of one form of 
taxation on this basis would be precarious, see further: Devereux, above n 25, 17. 
26 Shaheen F, ‘International Tax Neutrality: Reconsiderations’ (2007) 27 Virginia Tax Review 203. 
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and fail to capture all avoidance-related transactions or acknowledge the differing debt capacities of 
different companies.
27
 
It is arguably counter-intuitive for thin capitalisation rules, particularly since they are purportedly 
anti-avoidance rules dealing with firms’ funding decisions, to not further prioritise neutrality. A recent 
paper by Massimi and Petroni, cited by the European Commission, went as far as to say that 
“neutrality with regard to firms’ funding decisions makes theoretically redundant the adoption of thin 
capitalisation rules”.28 
Even though thin capitalisation rules are generally characterised as part of the anti-avoidance 
framework, this view is also questionable because thin capitalisation rules are “not ‘targeted anti-
abuse rules’ but structural changes intended to mitigate the effects of the deduction for interest on 
debt”.29 Leading commentators such as Burnett30 and Brown31 observe it is unfortunate that these 
rules are characterised as anti-abuse rules, highlighting that the legal basis for thin capitalisation rules 
does not reconcile with the economic basis. 
While it is arguable that even if thin capitalisation rules were re-designed to attain funding neutrality, 
attaining full neutrality
32
 between debt and equity is nearly impossible without full international tax 
coordination.
33
 Nonetheless, MNEs financing and investment decisions will always be responsive to 
the tax environment to the extent that they will engage in alternative means of minimising their tax 
liabilities,
34
 so a ‘second-best solution’ ought to be devised that attains as many of the good tax design 
criteria as practicable. Accordingly, the following section will consider funding neutrality in further 
detail. 
2.2.1.1.2 Mitigating the debt bias 
Most leading commentators and policymakers assume that thin capitalisation rules mitigate the debt 
bias, with the literature containing a plethora of statements such as: “Other methods of addressing 
debt bias … [include implementing] stronger thin capitalization rules”;35 “The Member States that did 
broaden their corporate tax base mostly focused on limiting interest deductibility to reduce the debt 
bias”;36 “Our results indicate that thin capitalization rules mitigate the sensitivity of affiliate leverage 
                                                          
27 Fiscal Affairs Department, ‘Debt Bias and Other Distortions: Crisis-Related Issues in Tax Policy’, International Monetary 
Fund, 12 June 2009, 13. 
28 Massimi F and Petroni C, ‘Real-World ACE Reforms and the Italian Experience. Towards a General Trend?’ (2012) 
40(11) Intertax 632. 
29 Brown P, General Report: The Debt-Equity Conundrum, 97b Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International (2012), 40-41. 
30 Burnett, above n 11, 45. 
31 Brown, above n 29. 
32 The tax neutrality principle states that tax systems should strive to be neutral such that decisions are made on their 
business or economic merits, rather than for tax reasons. 
33 Butler KC, Multinational Finance (USA: Thomson, 3rd ed, 2004), 440; In a real-world situation in which there are cross-
border flows of portfolio and direct investment, and also international trade, then all traditional forms of taxation would be 
distorting to some extent unless they were completely harmonised: see further, Diamond PA and Mirrlees JA, ‘Optimal 
Taxation and Public Production I: Production Efficiency’ (1971) 61(1) The American Economic Review 8; Devereux, above 
n 25; further, full neutrality between debt and equity would also require dividends, capital gains and interest payment being 
taxed at the same rate at the individual shareholder level: see further, Gammie M, ‘Corporate tax harmonization: an “ACE” 
proposal: harmonizing European corporate taxation through an allowance for corporate equity’ (1991) 31(8) European 
Taxation Journal 238. 
34 Mintz J and Smart M, ‘Income shifting, investment, and tax competition: theory and evidence from provincial taxation in 
Canada’ (2004) 88 Journal of Public Economics 1149; Weichenrieder AJ and Windishbauer H ‘Thin capitalization rules and 
company responses’ (CESifo Working Paper No 2456, November 2008); Buettner T and Wamser G, ‘Internal Debt and 
Multinationals’ Profit Shifting: Empirical Evidence form Firm-level Panel Data’ (Working Paper 0918, Oxford University 
Centre for Business Taxation, 2009); Schindler D and Schjelderup G, ‘Transfer Pricing and Debt Shifting in Multinationals’ 
(CESifo Working Paper Series No 4381, August 2013). 
35 Shaviro DN, ‘Income Tax Reform Implications of the Financial Crisis’, Chapter 7 in: Taxation and the Financial Crisis, 
edited by Alworth JS and Arachi G (UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), 180. 
36 European Commission, ‘Tax reforms in EU member states 2013: Tax policy challenges for economic growth and fiscal 
sustainability: 2013 Report’, European Economy 5 (Brussels: European Commission, DG ECFIN and DG TAXUD, October 
2013), 22. 
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ratios to corporate taxation”;37 “Several policy options are available which could limit the tax bias 
towards debt financing … [one] option is to implement thin capitalization rules”;38 “[debt] bias is 
reduced by the interest deduction limitation rules”;39 and, “Many countries have attempted to offset 
this debt bias … by imposing thin capitalization rules”,40 to cite just a few. 
The empirical evidence supports the proposition that thin capitalisation rules do impact MNEs 
financing decisions. Buettner et al,
41
 a leading study on thin capitalisation rules worldwide,
42
 find that 
the imposition of thin capitalisation rules results in a decline in internal debt-to-asset ratios. Despite 
acknowledging that the magnitude of internal debt shifting is relatively small, they finding that when 
thin capitalisation rules are introduced or tightened, the tax sensitivity of the internal debt ratio falls 
by about a half.
43
 Other empirical studies suggest that the debt-to-asset ratio is marginally tax 
sensitive, simulation results suggesting a 2.8–3.5% increase in internal debt-to-asset ratios following a 
10% increase in the corporate tax rate.
44
 Ruf and Schindler highlight the econometric difficulties in 
consistently recording and identifying the impact of thin capitalisation rules.
45
 This is strongly 
supported by Grubert and Altshuler, who observe that from an empirical analysis perspective, the 
models and estimates of behavioural elasticities required for judging an international corporate tax 
system definitively are beyond the scope of current knowledge.
46
 It is also noteworthy that the 
existing literature typically captures the tax advantages of debt by exclusively using information on 
tax rates, rather than considering other differences in tax codes that constrain leverage and thus the 
value of tax shields.
47
 So, even though there is extensive literature on neutrality principles, each 
proposed standard is based on simplifying assumptions.
48
 
Importantly, empirical results suggest that thin capitalisation rules are effective anti-avoidance 
provisions. However, some leading commentators suggest that rather than mitigating the debt bias, 
thin capitalisation rules simply encourage levels of debt at the specified threshold debt-equity ratios. It 
is plausible that MNEs are technically complying with thin capitalisation rules by gearing at the 
specified threshold levels, then utilising other means such as hybrid finance to bypass these rules. 
However, these legal design issues are not presently included in empirical analysis. 
While there is an extensive and growing literature across a number of disciplines that analyses 
corporate tax avoidance,
49
 leading academics such as Dharmapala observe that there is very little 
literature that directly studies the process and structure of corporate tax planning,
50
 with the exception 
of Mills et al.
51
 This signals a gap in the literature on the question of whether or not MNEs generally 
operate at or near the current legal limits. 
The following hypothetical scenario demonstrates the impact of tightening thin capitalisation rules on 
an MNE which is operating at the legal limits of the Australian thin capitalisation regime. The base 
figures are derived from the most relevant examples provided by the ATO, as contained in Taxation 
                                                          
37 Blouin J, Huizinga H, Laeven L and G Nicodème, ‘Thin capitalization rules and multinational firm capital structure’ 
(Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper WP 13/23, November 2013), 27 – it is noteworthy that this 
statement was removed from an updated version of the same paper published two months later in: Blouin et al, above n 4. 
38 Fatica S, Hemmelgarn T and Nicodème G, ‘The Debt-Equity Tax Bias: consequences and solution’ (Taxation Papers 
Working Paper No 33, European Commission, July 2012), 11. 
39 Bundgaard J and Tell M, ‘Tax neutrality and corporate financing’ (2010) 1 European Tax Studies, 20. 
40 World Bank, Lessons of Tax Reform: An Overview, edited by Thirsk W (Washington DC: World Bank Publications, 
1991), 11. 
41 Buettner et al, above n 62. 
42 Ruf and Schindler, above n 57. 
43 Buettner et al, above n 62. 
44 Desai, above n 75; Ruf and Schindler, above n 57, and footnotes cited therein. 
45 Ruf and Schindler, above n 57, 10. 
46 Grubert and Altshuler, above n 1, 319-321. 
47 Blouin et al, above n 4, 3. 
48 Grubert and Altshuler, above n 1, 319. 
49 For instance, for an analysis of analysis of the impact of corporate governance and executive compensation on tax 
avoidance activity see: Desai MA and Dharmapala D, ‘Taxation and Corporate Governance: An Economic Approach’ in: 
Schön W (ed.) Tax and Corporate Governance (Berlin, Germany: Springer Berlin-Heidelberg, 2008), 13–30. 
50 Dharmapala, above n 9. 
51 See Mills L, Erickson M, Maydew E, ‘Investments in Tax Planning’ (1998) 20(1) The Journal of the American Taxation 
Association 1-20. 
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Ruling TR2010/7. In relation to the inter-company loan shown in Figure 3 below, the thin 
capitalisation rules permitted a 3:1 gearing ratio (assuming an arm’s length rate of 12%, thereby 
allowing $36,000,000 in annual debt deductions)
52
 until they were recently amended by the Tax and 
Superannuation Laws Amendment (2014 Measures No 4) Act 2014 (Cth) to a 1.5:1 gearing ratio. 
Figure 3 
 
Key:   A = assets, D = debt, E = equity, 15% = intercompany interest rate,                                                                                                                      
12% = arm’s length rate. 
This presents a conflict that is a legitimate struggle from a policy perspective. Namely, if a foreign 
company first goes out of its way to undercapitalise its Australian operations (for example at 
materially less than a 3:1 gearing ratio), and then lends money to that subsidiary at junk bond (albeit 
arm’s length) interest rates, this would effectively allow more debt deductions, while presenting a loss 
of potential FDI flows and a potentially higher risk of bankruptcy.
53
 
The recent move to a 1.5:1 gearing ratio, even though it was proposed for revenue reasons, arguably 
encourages a more equal balance of debt and equity finance. However, this paper submits that 
regulatory changes reducing the allowable debt to equity ratio should not be conflated with attaining 
funding neutrality. This is demonstrated by Figure 4, whereby the Australian subsidiary has the option 
of simply halving debt levels from $300,000,000 to $150,000,000. This has the implication of 
reducing its FDI flows into Australia.
54
 
                                                          
52 Australian Taxation Office, Income tax: the interaction of Division 820 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 and the 
transfer pricing provisions (27 October 2010) ATO Taxation Ruling TR2010/7, available at: 
http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?DocID=TXR/TR20107/NAT/ATO/00001. See, Example 1: Australian thin 
capitalisation rules currently provide a 3:1 debt to equity safe harbour for general inbound and outbound investment. An 
Australian subsidiary of a foreign parent has $400,000,000 assets, $100,000,000 share capital and $300,000,000 loans at 
15% interest from its parent. On this basis, it has satisfied the safe harbour ratio of the thin capitalisation rules and claims 
$45,000,000 in annual debt deductions. Assuming that the maximum amount that the subsidiary could borrow on arm’s 
length terms in the open market was $190,000,000 with an interest rate of 12%, the subsidiary would only be able to deduct 
$36,000,000, being interest at 12% on the $300,000,000 of actual debt which is at the safe harbour limit. Further, the ATO 
rejects the view that it must accept the safe harbour amount as in effect a deemed arm’s length amount of debt and then carry 
out the transfer pricing analysis of the interest rate on that basis. 
53 Greenwoods & Freehills, ‘Tax Brief: Transfer pricing and thin capitalisation’, 23 December 2009, available at: 
http://www.gf.com.au/Transfer_pricing_and_thin_capitalisation.pdf. 
54 The link between tightening debt deductions through thin capitalisation rules and reduced investment has been established 
by Buettner et al, “… tax policy should take account of the adverse investment effects of restrictions on tax planning by 
means of debt finance. Imposing restrictions alone does not enable tax policy to escape the fundamental questions 
concerning the corporation tax realised by the emergence of multinationals”: Buettner et al, above n 62, 32. 
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Figure 4 
 
 
Further, Ruf and Schindler posit that the empirical evidence merely supports the proposition that, for 
the average MNE, there is no need to implement thin capitalisation rules because of their nominal 
impact.
55
 They observe that the mismatch between anecdotal evidence provided by tax consultants 
and auditors, and the relatively weak empirical evidence concerning all MNEs is attributable to the 
fact that most MNEs do not engage in international debt shifting. Rather, they believe that only a few 
large MNEs engage in aggressive tax planning and that thin capitalisation rules cause significant 
collateral damage by requiring non tax-aggressive MNEs to bear the administrative burden of these 
complex rules.
56
 
To the best of this author’s knowledge, this evidence remains anecdotal, indicating a research need for 
empirical studies confirming this proposition. Research in this area is also lacking surveys or 
interviews with accounting and law firm partners, and private equity firm managers, which could be 
the subject of future research. 
 
2.2.2 Legal design weaknesses 
Legal analysis of thin capitalisation rules is usually limited to commentators analysing a single point 
in time and from the perspective of one jurisdiction only, despite the exponentially increasing 
implementation of, and extensive commentary on, these rules. The tax design of thin capitalisation 
rules
57
 remains understudied in the corporate finance literature, despite criticism from leading 
commentators; notably, de Mooij:
58
 
“Several countries have introduced measures that put a cap on interest deductibility, often 
called thin capitalization rules or income stripping rules. They seem to have reduced debt 
ratios―most likely through adjusting the levels of intra-company debt to which many of these 
rules apply. Yet, they also seem to have reduced investment. Moreover, these rules are only 
imperfect solutions to the problem of debt bias and come along with other costs. In fact, they 
are usually ad-hoc, not well targeted, and are often avoided by firms that can exploit hybrid 
instruments and international differences in definitions of debt and equity. Closing loopholes 
generally leads to refinements and complexities of tax laws” 
Accordingly, the following sections highlight three key legal design issues; first, the ad hoc nature of 
thin capitalisation rules; second, their complexity; and third, the tax arbitrage opportunities they 
encourage. 
                                                          
55 Ruf M and Schindler D, ‘Debt Shifting and Thin-Capitalization Rules – German Experience and Alternative Approaches’ 
(NHH Discussion Paper, RRR 06-2012, 13 December 2012), 9. 
56 Ruf and Schindler, above n 55, 9-10. 
57 Ruf and Schindler, above n 55; Arnold, above n 5; Piltz, above n 5; Dourado and and de la Feria, above n 3. 
58 Ruud de Mooij, Fiscal Affairs Department, UK Parliamentary Commission for Banking Standards, Written evidence 
submitted by the International Monetary Fund, 24 June 2013, 502. 
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2.2.2.1.1 Ad hoc application 
Thin capitalisation rules are generally ad hoc from both a domestic perspective and also an 
international consistency perspective. 
Domestically, existing debt-to-equity ratios are blunt rules that are neither industry nor entity specific. 
It is therefore questionable that they can be considered suitable proxies for ascertaining whether the 
borrowing company is truly geared with the motivation of engaging in debt shifting. Remarkably, thin 
capitalisation rules assume that it is possible to estimate these ratios for all companies within all 
industries in the one jurisdiction.
59
 In reality, customising thin capitalisation rules to specific 
industries and deciding on appropriate industry-specific ratios would be nearly impossible. Even if 
this were administratively feasible, it would also be difficult to assign firms to specific industries if 
they operated across multiple industries.
60
 Further, leverage ratios are likely to be a function of size, 
complexity and international operations of the MNE. 
Internationally, no two countries have identical thin capitalisation rules. Further, interest limitation 
regimes appear to be rather unstable – most countries have rewritten theirs at least once. Despite the 
variability, most countries’ rules sit somewhere along a spectrum which has at one end a stand-alone 
entity approach, and at the other end a worldwide ratio approach. Leading commentators such as 
Burnett question the appropriateness of a single arm’s length leverage ratio or interest rate for a given 
subsidiary, or even a workable range of ratios and rates.
61
 Even though empirical evidence supports 
the proposition that thin capitalisation rules technically restrict internal borrowing by MNCs,
62
 it is 
relatively simple for MNEs to circumvent these rules. For example, entities falling outside the 
threshold levels are openly advised to reassess their thin capitalisation positions by either: reducing 
debt; re-valuing assets; or, re-capitalising to prevent the denial of interest expenditure.
63
 Accordingly, 
thin capitalisation rules are arbitrary, ad hoc provisions that fail to effectively target avoidance-related 
transactions.
64
 
2.2.2.1.2 Complicated framework 
It goes without saying that the problem of profit shifting will not, and cannot, be completely solved by 
introducing anti-abuse rules, be it through domestic legislation or international tax treaties.
65
 Rather, 
the key challenge is in striking an appropriate balance of policy considerations in devising robust anti-
avoidance rules that adequately protect the tax base without imposing excessive compliance costs or 
hampering normal business operations of MNEs.
66
  
For instance, in addition to Australia’s thin capitalisation rules, there is a wider international tax 
framework including but not limited to complex debt and equity rules; dividend imputation and 
corporate shareholder taxation issues;
67
 withholding taxes;
68
 other jurisdictions’ thin capitalisation 
                                                          
59 Burnett, above n 11. 
60 Farrar J and Mawani A, ‘Debt-Equity Limitations in Thin Capitalization Rules: Canadian Evidence’ (Paper presented at 
CAAA 2008 Annual Conference, 4 January 2008). 
61 Burnett, above n 11. 
62 Overesch M and Wamser G, ‘Bilateral internal debt financing and tax planning of multinational firms’ (2014) 42(2) 
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 191.; Buettner T, Overesch M, Schreiber U and Wamser G, ‘The Impact of 
Thin-Capitalization Rules on the Capital Structure of Multinational Firms’ (2012) 96 Journal of Public Economics, 930–938; 
Ruf M and Schindler D, ‘Debt Shifting and Thin-Capitalization Rules – German Experience and Alternative Approaches’ 
(NHH Discussion Paper, RRR 06-2012, 13 December 2012). 
63 PwC, ‘Tighter thin capitalisation regime to limit Australian debt deductions’ (26 September 2013), available at: 
http://www.pwc.com.au/tax/federal-budget/2013/thin-capitalisation.htm. 
64 Fiscal Affairs Department, above n 27, 13. 
65 Traversa, above n 12. 
66 OECD, Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements: Tax Policy and Compliance Issues (Paris: OECD Publishing, March 2012). 
67 See further Taylor CJ, ‘Approximating Capital-Export Neutrality in Imputation Systems: Proposal for a Limited 
Exemption Approach’ (2003) 57 Bulletin for International Taxation 135; Taylor CJ, ‘Development of and Prospects for 
Corporate-Shareholder Taxation in Australia’ (2003) 57 Bulletin for International Taxation 346. 
68 Importantly, the Henry Review criticised Australia’s current treatment of foreign debt as complex and distortionary, 
recommending a reduction in the interest withholding tax rate to zero among tax treaty partners. With an effective interest 
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rules; bilateral tax treaties; the interactions with the OECD Model Tax Convention, including Articles 
9(1) and 24(4); OECD Guidelines; and other OECD materials. For completeness, there is also a close 
connection between anti-abuse rules concerning excessive interest and CFC rules.
69
 Australia’s 
existing thin capitalisation regime contained in Division 820 of the ITAA 1997 currently spans over 
150 pages of legislation,
70
 with highly technical rules requiring complicated calculations. There is a 
strong consensus in the literature that the existing thin capitalisation framework is highly technical 
and complicated.  
This calls into question whether the thin capitalisation rules achieve simplicity and transparency. The 
literature also questions whether the existing legal design of these rules conflicts with the 
effectiveness and fairness principles.
71
 
2.2.2.1.3 Tax arbitrage opportunities 
The literature also recognises that thin capitalisation rules may be avoided by MNEs that can exploit 
tax arbitrage opportunities; namely, hybrid financial instruments and international differences in 
definitions of debt and equity.
72
 Despite the literature acknowledging these issues,
73
 very few 
empirical papers examine this aspect.
74
 Instead, the literature analysing thin capitalisation rules 
focusses on their impact on intercompany loans, and it generally limited to datasets from the United 
States
75
 and the EU.
76
  
Further, the finance literature often identifies the tax deductibility of debt as the most significant 
factor governing the choice between third-party debt and equity finance. However, from an economic 
substance perspective, the reasons put forward to distinguish third-party debt from equity generally do 
not hold in an intra-group situation. Also, empirical findings suggest that intra-group debt and third-
party debt are substitutable.
77
 This warrants challenging the need for, and utility of, Australia’s debt 
and equity rules
78
 in the context of the thin capitalisation rules.
79
 This provides the basis for further 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
withholding tax rate of 3.5%, liability for withholding tax would likely not outweigh the advantages of interest deductibility 
given comparative levels of corporate tax. While the literature has recognised the debt bias as prevalent in the foreign debt 
context, leading policy makers have called for the reduction of interest withholding tax to 0% provided appropriate 
safeguards exist to limit tax avoidance: “Recommendation 34: Consideration should be given to negotiating, in future tax 
treaties or amendments to treaties, a reduction in interest withholding tax to zero so long as there are appropriate 
safeguards to limit tax avoidance”; Henry K, Harmer J, Piggott J, Ridout H and Smith G, Australia’s Future Tax System: 
Report to the Treasurer, Commonwealth of Australia, December 2009, Part 2, Chapter B1–4 (‘Henry Review’), available at: 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/FinalReport.aspx?doc=html/publications/Papers/Final_Report_Part_2/chapter_b1-
4.htm. 
69 OECD, above n 147, 17 and 31. For an analysis of the effectiveness of CFC provisions, see Ruf M and Weichenrieder AJ, 
‘The Taxation of Passive Foreign Investment: Lessons from German Experience’ (CESifo Working Papers No 2624, April 
2009). 
70 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). 
71 Webber, above n 18. 
72 By way of background, the difference between debt and equity stems from the legal, finance and accounting realms, rather 
than being grounded in tax or economic principles. Unlike finance, neither tax nor economics is concerned with the function 
of debt as a safeguard for third party liabilities. Accordingly, the non-neutrality in the tax treatment between debt and equity 
finance (in other words, the tax-induced debt bias) is distortive from a tax perspective, creates complexity, encourages 
avoidance, and adds unnecessary administrative and compliance costs for both MNEs and governments. These issues are 
exacerbated in the context of cross-border hybrids: OECD, Public Discussion Draft, BEPS Action 2: Neutralise the Effects of 
Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements (Recommendations for Domestic Laws), 19 March 2014 – 2 May 2014, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/aggressive/hybrid-mismatch-arrangements-discussion-draft-domestic-laws-recommendations-
march-2014.pdf. 
73 De Mooij RA and Keen MJ, ‘Debt, Taxes and Banks’ (IMF Working Paper 12/48, February 2012). 
74 The only detailed discussion of the treatment of hybrid finance under thin capitalisation rules appears to be in 
Klostermann, above n 6. 
75 Data was used from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis: Desai M, Foley CF and Hines JR, ‘The Costs of Shared 
Ownership: Evidence from International Joint Ventures’ (2004) 73(2) Journal of Financial Economics 323. 
76 A large mirco-level panel dataset of virtually all German MNCs compiled by Deutsche Bundesbank, which included 
information about the actual amount of internal debt used by foreign affiliates, distinguished into loans from the parent and 
loans received from other foreign affiliates: Buettner T and Wamser G, ‘Internal Debt and Multinational Profit Shifting: 
Empirical Evidence form Firm-level Panel Data’ (2013) 66(1) National Tax Journal 63, 69.  
77 Burnett, above n 11; see further studies cited therein. 
78 Division 974 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). 
79 Division 820 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). 
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research by the author. 
 
3 FUNDAMENTAL REFORM: ADDRESSING THE 
CROSS-BORDER DEBT BIAS 
Thin capitalisation rules aim to prevent the erosion of the tax revenue base of a particular jurisdiction. 
However, the phenomenon of thin capitalisation arises from the decisions of revenue authorities to 
create a tax-induced cross-border debt bias, which presents opportunities for tax base erosion.
80
 
Rather than introducing or tightening thin capitalisation legislation, which merely tackles the 
‘symptom’ of debt shifting, it is arguably more effective to instead align the tax treatment of debt and 
equity financing to eliminate the tax incentive for thin capitalisation. This would address the 
underlying ‘disease’ of the debt bias.  
It is important to not conflate successfully restricting debt deductibility with successfully attaining 
funding neutrality. Regardless of whether the amount of the debt deduction (r
D
) is limited through the 
‘arm’s length’ approach or the ‘ratio’ approach, this is expressed as rcapped% for ease of reference. On 
the other hand, equity deductions (r
E
) are denied, which can be expressed as a deduction of 0%. 
Conceptualised in this way, limiting the deductibility of interest expenses through thin capitalisation 
rules may be misplaced in that such a limitation does not address the tax-induced cross-border debt 
bias (the underlying ‘disease’) by equalising the tax treatment of debt and equity financing. Rather, 
thin capitalisation rules merely target the behaviour of cross-border debt shifting (the ‘symptom’). In 
other words, thin capitalisation rules mitigate the impact of the symptom yet neglect the impact of the 
disease, as shown in Table 1 below. This format will also be subsequently applied for each reform 
option considered in this paper. 
Table 1 
 
However, several fundamental reform options exist which would, in theory, eliminate the distinction 
between debt and equity in the corporate tax regime; either by disallowing deductions for the cost of 
debt financing, providing deductions for the cost of equity financing, or allowing deductions for the 
cost of both debt and equity financing. 
Proposed fundamental reforms addressing each of these three options are the comprehensive business 
income tax (‘CBIT’), the allowance for corporate equity (‘ACE’), and the allowance for corporate 
capital (‘ACC’), respectively. However, of these three reforms only the ACE has been experimented 
with in practice. Further, these fundamental reforms have only been conceptualised as reforms 
addressing the domestic-level debt bias. It is therefore instructive to consider reform proposals 
targeting the cross-border aspect, as shown in Table 2 below.
81
  
                                                          
80 Hanlon D, ‘Thin Capitalisation Legislation and the Australia/United States Double Tax Convention: Can They Work 
Together?’ (2000) 3(1) Journal of Australian Taxation 4. 
81 OECD, Fundamental Reform of Corporate Income Tax, Volume 16 of OECD Tax Policy Studies (Paris: OECD 
Publishing, 2007), 155. 
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Table 2 
 
For completeness, although beyond the scope of Table 2, this paper will also examine the “combined 
ACE-CBIT” (a recently suggested hybrid of the ACE and the CBIT). 
Consequently, the following sections consider the theoretical desirability and practical feasibility of 
the CBIT, the ACE, the ACC and the more recently proposed combined ACE-CBIT. This analysis is 
conducted with a view to examine in further research by the author whether, and if so how, the thin 
capitalisation rules could be replaced by one of these fundamental reforms. 
 
3.1 COMPREHENSIVE BUSINESS INCOME TAX 
The CBIT eliminates the debt bias by denying existing debt deductibility, thereby affording no tax 
deductions for either debt or equity financing. First proposed by the US Department of the Treasury, 
and more recently proposed by the IMF,
82
 the CBIT aims to end the classical double taxation of 
source income.
83
 It has its theoretical foundations in the fundamental equivalence between a corporate 
income tax levied at source and an equal-rate personal income tax on corporate earnings with full 
credit for the underlying corporate income tax.  
Utilising the same inter-company loan scenario described earlier, Figure 5 below reflects no tax 
deduction being afforded to the Australian subsidiary.  
                                                          
82 The IMF proposed a CBIT which denies interest deductibility for corporate income tax altogether while exempting interest 
received: IMF, ‘A Fair and Substantial Contribution by the Financial Sector: Final Report for the G-20’ (June 2010), 
available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/062710b.pdf. 
83 United States Government, Department of the Treasury, ‘Report of the Department of the Treasury on Integration of the 
Individual and Corporate Tax Systems: Taxing Business Income Once’, January 1992. 
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Figure 5 
 
The CBIT equalises the tax treatment of debt and equity financing, by reducing the extent of 
deductibility to 0% (so, under this system r
D
 = r
E
 = 0%). Accordingly, the CBIT would eliminate both 
the symptom of debt shifting and the underlying disease of the cross-border debt bias, thereby 
attaining funding neutrality. This is shown in Table 3 below. 
Table 3 
 
While prima facie the CBIT achieves funding neutrality, it is important to take a balanced view with 
reference to both the advantages and disadvantages of the CBIT, with are subject to continuing debate 
in the literature. The key advantages, in addition to attaining funding neutrality, include the ability to 
implement a policy of tax-cut-cum-base-broadening, neutrality of organisational form, less 
vulnerability to international profit-shifting, potentially improving investment. The key disadvantages 
include introducing a distinction between real and financial activities of MNEs,
84
 the risks of an 
economy-wide capital decumulation and deterring foreign portfolio investors and inbound FDI, and 
potentially substantial welfare losses and transition difficulties, including the need for special 
depreciation allowances or provisions for immediate write-offs. These are each dealt with in turn as 
follows. 
3.1.1 Theoretical desirability 
In addition to attaining funding neutrality by denying all deductions at corporate level for dividends 
and interest paid to shareholders and debt-holders, a CBIT also exempts from tax items at the level of 
the recipient by applying to individuals, corporations, exempt entities and non-residents.
85
 This attains 
neutrality of organisational form. So, in principle, the CBIT makes personal tax on corporate source 
income redundant.
86
 The CBIT greatly reduces the distinction between retained and distributed 
earnings (depending on the treatment of capital gains). Further, unlike a cash flow tax, assets are 
depreciated over their lifetime under the CBIT, as they would be under a conventional income tax, 
thereby taxing the normal return on capital.
87
 
 
                                                          
84 Auerbach AJ, ‘Tax Reform in the 21st Century’, in: Diamond J and Zodrow G (eds.) Fundamental Tax Reform: Issues, 
Choices, and Implications (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008) 27–74, 49. 
85 Cnossen S, ‘Company Taxes in the European Union: Criteria and Options for Reform’ (1996) 17(4) Fiscal Studies 67, 86. 
86 Sørensen and Johnson, above n 6, 213. 
87 Cnossen, above n 85. 
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3.1.2 Broadening the tax base 
Leading commentators Sørensen and Johnson maintain that if the CBIT is accompanied by a lower 
statutory tax rate, domestic business tax revenue would become less vulnerable to international profit-
shifting through transfer pricing and thin capitalisation.
88
 This proposition is widely supported in the 
literature, as the growing opportunities for international income shifting strengthens the case for a 
policy of tax-cut-cum-base-broadening.
89
  
On the other hand, the IMF has observed that even though a standalone CBIT broadens the tax base it 
also increases capital costs.
90
  Since the CBIT increases the cost of capital, a lower number of 
profitable investments which offer the minimum required rate of return will be available, resulting in 
less investments being carried out, implying that each firm will operate at a lower capital intensity. 
The literature has observed that this would result in an economy-wide capital decumulation. The 
literature also suggests that firms will reduce their labour demand, gross wages would decrease and 
even though a lower tax rate would apply, this would not be enough to compensate for the negative 
effects of the reform.
91
 
 
3.1.3 Attracting international investment 
Further, in the context of a small, open economy such as Australia, leading commentators Sørensen 
and Johnson suggest that the CBIT is an attractive option, despite the obvious disincentive of denying 
debt deductibility, as it would attract more inbound FDI with positive spill-overs on the domestic 
economy.
92
 
However, there are three issues with Sørensen and Johnson’s position. First, there are no real-world 
examples of CBIT systems to substantiate this inference.
93
 Second, since the CBIT involves a source-
based tax on the normal return to capital,
94
 it is likely to generate significant distortions by deterring 
foreign portfolio investors. Third, without first lowering corporate tax rates it is unclear how denying 
debt deductions (thereby raising the cost of debt and, in turn, rendering fewer investments profitable 
at the margin) would attract more inbound FDI.
95
 This is supported by leading commentators such as 
Radulescu and Stimmelmayr, who are sceptical that the CBIT would benefit a small, open economy, 
since most countries would likely want to attract investors while broadening their tax base.
96
  
Contrary to the assumption that a CBIT would encourage international investment, Radulescu and 
Stimmelmayr’s simulation results suggest the investment incentives produced by a CBIT would be 
outweighed by the decline in investment, wages, disposable income, consumption and ultimately 
welfare. 
Accordingly, governments would need to be careful when determining how to finance the CBIT. 
Simulation results suggest that if the CBIT reforms are financed by a change in the GST/VAT rate 
rather than the corporate tax rate, introducing a CBIT would have negative consequences for 
investment. Also, if the implementation of a CBIT was not accompanied by special depreciation 
allowances or provisions for immediate write-offs, it could even lead to welfare losses.
97
 Even though 
                                                          
88 Sørensen and Johnson, above n 6, 213. 
89 See further, Sørensen and Johnson, above n 6, 213. 
90 Fiscal Affairs Department, above n 64. 
91 Radulescu DM and Stimmelmayr M, ‘ACE vs. CBIT: Which is Better for Investment and Welfare?’ (2007) 53(2) CESifo 
Economic Series 294. 
92 Sørensen and Johnson, above n 6, 213. 
93 De Mooij RA, ‘Tax Biases to Debt Finance: Assessing the Problem, Finding Solutions’ (IMF Staff Discussion Note 
SDN/11/11, 3 May 2011). 
94 Sørensen and Johnson, above n 6, 213. 
95 De Mooij RA and Devereux MP, ‘An applied analysis of ACE and CBIT reforms in the EU’ (2011) 18(1) International 
Tax and Public Finance 93, 98. 
96 Radulescu and Stimmelmayr, above n 91. 
97 Radulescu and Stimmelmayr, above n 91. 
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these simulation results are very sensitive to the magnitude of the parameters, Radulescu and 
Stimmelmayr posit that it is clear that the pure CBIT would not produce favourable results.
98
  
 
3.1.4 Transitional difficulties 
In addition to the practical obstacles associated with implementing the CBIT; namely, that it can only 
be implemented gradually over a fairly long time horizon, it is also unclear how to best mitigate the 
transitional difficulties in dealing with pre-existing debt issued in full expectation of deductibility
99
 
and the short-run risk of the CBIT amplifying financial distress.
100
 The CBIT also presents significant 
issues with MNEs being unable to claim foreign tax credits in their home country,
101
 and the literature 
suggests that this may exacerbate capital decumulation. Further, financial institutions would be paying 
little or no corporate income tax under the CBIT; having no tax due on interest received, and non-
interest deductible costs.
102
 Despite suggesting that in aggregate this might be more than offset by 
increased payments by other companies, the literature does not specifically address how this would be 
acceptable from both a political and a revenue base protection perspective. 
It is clear that the CBIT, a conceptual cousin of thin capitalisation rules, owes much of its popularity 
to the possibility of a lower statutory corporate tax rate.
103
 However, the disadvantages associated 
with a CBIT provide support for the position that it is not the undeniable fundamental reform of 
choice, with some leading commentators showing a strong preference for both the ACE and the ACC 
over the CBIT.
104
 The literature pertaining to these reform alternatives are examined in the subsequent 
sections. 
 
3.2 ALLOWANCE FOR CORPORATE EQUITY 
The literature generally considers that the ACE eliminates the debt bias by allowing a deduction for 
the nominal cost of equity financing, in addition to existing debt deductibility, thereby equalising the 
tax treatment of debt and equity financing. 
In terms of its historical development, the ACE originated in the 1970’s with the Meade Committee105 
proposing alternatives to the UK tax system. This was followed by research published by leading 
commentators Boadway and Bruce,
106
 who placed the theoretical foundations for a corporate tax 
system that is neutral to investment financing decisions by suggesting an allowance for corporate 
capital (ACC).
107
 Unlike the ACC [section 3.3.1 below], which provides a deduction for the overall 
cost of capital, the ACE maintains the current deductibility of the actual cost of debt finance and 
allows a notional return on equity to be deductible against corporate profits. The ACE system 
regained interest after its implementation was put on the agenda by the IFS Capital Taxes Group,
108
 
who recommended a practical proposal.  
                                                          
98 Radulescu and Stimmelmayr, above n 91, 31-33. 
99 Chaudhry SM, Mullineux AW and Agarwal N, ‘Balancing Bank Regulation and Taxation’ (4 February 2014), available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1141090. 
100 De Mooij, above n 58; see further, De Mooij, above n 93; Fiscal Affairs Department, above n 64, 13-14. 
101 Fiscal Affairs Department, above n 64, 13-14. 
102 IMF, above n 82, 63. 
103 European Commission, above n 36. 
104 Sørensen and Johnson, above n 6, 215, 233. 
105 Institute for Fiscal Studies, The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation (George Allen & Unwin: 1978); available at: 
http://www.ifs.org.uk/docs/meade.pdf. 
106 Boadway RW and Bruce NDB, ‘A general proposition on the design of a neutral business tax’ (1984) 24(2) Journal of 
Public Economics 231. 
107 De Mooij and Devereux, above n 95, 96. 
108 Institute for Fiscal Studies, Equity for Companies: A Corporation Tax for the 1990S, Fourth report of the IFS Capital 
Taxes Group, Commentary No 26 (Chameleon Press: 1991), available at: http://www.ifs.org.uk/comms/comm26.pdf. 
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3.2.1 Theoretical desirability and practical feasibility 
According to the theoretical literature, the ACE has many desirable theoretical properties, the most 
noteworthy and widely accepted of which is funding neutrality, suggesting the ACE successfully 
eliminates the debt bias at the corporate level.
109
 This is supported by an extensive body of empirical 
literature
110
 finding that corporate income taxes directly influence capital structure,
111
 and that an ACE 
in practice ameliorates the tax-induced debt bias.
112
 
Further advantages of the ACE include bringing the tax system significantly closer to attaining 
CIN/CEN, if accompanied with the elimination of withholding taxes.
113
 The ACE is also assumed 
neutral regarding marginal investment, with leading commentators Sørensen and Johnson observing 
“it only taxes economic rents (in excess of normal profits), without distorting marginal investment 
decisions”.114 Even though the ACE can be characterised as a tax on economic rents, it also retains a 
superficial resemblance to an income tax,
115
 which would likely improve its prospects of being 
considered a feasible reform option. Further desirable properties of the ACE include its investment, 
capital accumulation and welfare benefits, particularly in the context of small, open economies, and 
its ability to lower the risk of bankruptcy by encouraging firm capitalisation.
116
 Moreover, the ACE 
system is considered insensitive to the method of tax depreciation and inflation.
117
 This is because 
accelerated depreciation for tax purposes reduces the book value of assets, decreasing the base on 
which ACE is calculated. The present value of this latter reduction exactly offsets the benefits of the 
accelerated depreciation. A similar effect is present for inflation, where an increase in profits because 
of inflation is offset by a higher notional return.
118
 
However, commentators have challenged the efficiency of ACE in complex settings, citing issues 
such as agency problems
119
 and credit constraints
120
 would reduce its efficiency properties.
121
 
Further, the funding neutrality property of the ACE has been challenged by commentators such as 
Schindler et al on the basis that in a market with free entry the ACE would distort the market 
                                                          
109 Devereux MP and Freeman H, ‘A general neutral profits tax’ (1991) 12(3) Fiscal Studies 1; Chen D Lee FC and Mintz 
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therein, including: Modigliani and Miller (1958), Stiglitz (1973), King (1974); Titman and Wessels (1988), Fisher, Heinkel 
and Zechner (1989), Ang and Peterson (1986), Long and Lalitz (1985), MacKie-Mason (1990) [the first paper to find clear 
evidence of substantial tax effects on the choice between issuing debt or equity], Graham (1996), Heider and Ljungqvist 
(2012), Kestens, Van Cauwenberge and Christiaens (2012). 
112 Chaudhry, above n 99; see further, Staderini A, ‘Tax reforms to influence corporate financial policy: the case of the 
Italian business tax reform of 1997-98’ (Banca D’Italia No 423, 2001), Princen, above n 111; Chen et al, above n 109; and 
Klemm, above n 109.  
113 Gammie, above n 33. 
114 European Commission, above n 36, 64; Sørensen and Johnson, above n 6, 213. 
115 McLure CE, Mintz J and Zodorow GR, ‘US Supreme Court Unanimously Chooses Substance over Form in Foreign Tax 
Credit Case: Implications of the PPL Decision for the Creditability of Cash-flow Taxes’ (Working Paper 14/11, Oxford 
University Centre for Business Taxation, August 2014), 10. 
116 Radulescu and Stimmelmayr, above n 91. 
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Tax Design: The Mirrlees Review (2010) Oxford University Press; see also, Keuschnigg C, ‘The Design of Capital Income 
Taxation: Reflections on the Mirrlees Review’ 2011 Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies 32(3) 437–452; see further, 
Cooper GS, ‘Implementing an allowance for corporate equity’ (2012) 27 Australian Tax Forum 241–271. 
118 De Mooij and Devereux, above n 95, 96. 
119 Koethenbuerger M and Stimmelmayr M, ‘Corporate taxation and corporate governance’ (CESIfo Working Paper 2881, 
December 2009). 
120 Keuschnigg C and Ribi E, ‘Proﬁt taxes and ﬁnancing constraints’ (2013) 20(5) International Tax and Public Finance 
808. 
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equilibrium, suggesting that the neutrality property would no longer hold when firms are mobile.
122
 
However, one of the limitations of this critique is that, although it refers to empirical evidence, 
Schindler et al do not cross-reference the experience of ACE in practice and assume that capital is 
perfectly elastic. Further, Schindler et al also critique the real-world corporate tax rates as too low, 
alluding to international tax competition placing strong pressure to decrease corporate tax rates.
123
  
Despite acknowledging the challenges associated with cross-border flows, commentators such as 
Sørensen continue to advocate in favour of the ACE and maintain that it does achieve funding 
neutrality.
124
 Indeed, compared to the original proposal by Devereux and Freeman, the only difference 
is that in Sørensen’s calculation of the equity base he subtracts net new equity provided to foreign 
branches to prevent investments that do not generate tax revenue from eroding the domestic tax base. 
Dividends received from foreign companies are included in the equity base provided they are 
reinvested in the home country, thereby including all domestic investment in the domestic ACE 
allowance.
125
   
Further, Sørensen acknowledges that, provided there is a lack of international tax coordination, the 
incentive for MNEs to engage in transfer pricing will always exist.
126
 Despite its goal of eliminating 
the debt bias, the ACE literature fails to address the fundamental problem created by the arbitrary 
distinction in international taxation whereby equity-financed outbound investments are taxed abroad 
while debt-financed outbound investments are taxed at home. Leading commentators acknowledge 
that this is a fundamental problem with the ACE literature, going to “the heart of the question of 
where multinationals’ profits should be taxed and whether the international tax system should 
maintain the existing source-basis rules”.127 However, this is beyond the scope of this paper, which 
assumes that source-based taxation will remain in place for the foreseeable future. 
3.2.1.1 ACE in practice 
Since its theoretical inception, the ACE has garnered substantial support from leading academics with 
increasing interest from policy-makers internationally.
128
 Indeed, the ACE is one of the few 
fundamental reform proposals to have been experimented with in practice, with several countries 
having experimented with ACE-variants;
129
 including Austria (2000–2004),130 Croatia (1994–
2000),
131
 Belgium (2006–today), Brazil (1996–today),132 Italy (1997–2003133 and 2011–today)134 and 
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Latvia (2009–2013).135 Leading commentators observe that the repeal of each of these ACE-variants 
was not because of any fundamental problem with the theoretical ACE,
136
 nor any technical flaws in 
the ACE system.
137
 Rather, the abolition of these ACE-variants was in line with the dominant trend of 
reducing headline corporate income tax rates in the context of ‘tax-rate cut cum base broadening’.138 
This paper focusses on the Belgian and Italian ACE-variants for the following three-fold rationale. 
First, leading commentators have described these two countries jurisdictions’ ACE-variants as closest 
to the theoretical ACE; second, these two countries jurisdictions’ ACE-variants are the only ACE-
variants currently in operation; and third, these two jurisdictions’ reforms are relatively well-
documented, with a substantial amount of information available online, including both extrinsic and 
intrinsic materials, which greatly assists the process of archival research and analysis. 
The tax design criteria that were most consistently adopted by these ACE-variants were economic 
efficiency (with a focus on funding neutrality), international competitiveness and growth. In the 
Belgian Notional Interest Deduction (‘Belgian NID’)139 context, the literature identifies four key 
motivations for introducing this reform: first, regional tax rate competition; second, improving 
corporations’ solvency by addressing the debt bias; third, replacing the coordination centre regime; 
and, fourth, tax neutrality. In the Italian context, the primary aims of the Italian Dual Income Tax 
(‘Italian DIT’)140 were two-fold: first, to lower the effective tax rate by reducing the debt bias; and 
second, to encourage FDI inflows. Subsequently, the Aiuto alla Crescita Economica (‘Italian 
ACE’)141 reform, introduced in 2011, aimed to first, provide for austerity measures; second, to provide 
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rate. For qualifying SMEs the notional interest rate is increased by 0.5%. The adjusted equity balance corresponds to the 
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misuses. However, this calculation has received much criticism in the literature, including that companies do not need to 
generate new investments to benefit from the Belgian NID. 
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the Corporate Tax Burden?’ (2007) 1 Rivista di Statistica Ufficiale 31. 
141 As originally drafted, the Italian ACE invoked the Italian DIT in some respects. A substantial improvement on the Italian 
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whole of 2011. This ensures the Italian ACE was more closely aligned to the original ACE principles, directly and 
immediately allowing deductions for equity financing and not providing an upper limit to the increases in equity financing.  
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a stimulus for the Italian economy thereby restoring a balanced budget by 2013; and, third, to achieve 
funding neutrality
142
 and thereby enhance the capital structure of Italian companies by stimulating 
company capitalisation.
143
 
These ACE-variants have received considerable attention from the economic literature, which 
currently has a corporate tax neutrality focus. Despite the ACE literature acknowledging the relevance 
and importance of also considering the legal, accounting and political issues,
144
 these aspects remain 
understudied. Overall, the literature is broadly separated into the following two categories: first, 
commentators focussing on one given jurisdiction when conducting simulation studies; or second, 
relatively brief legal commentary of individual jurisdictions’ ACE frameworks at one point in time.145  
There is a very limited literature providing a comparative analysis of ACE-variants in practice; and 
the literature that does so is limited to the economic paradigm, rather than providing in-depth legal 
analysis.  
The majority of the English-language literature provides a distinct focus on economic modelling 
rather than engaging in any legal analysis.
146
 One of the exceptions is an OECD report providing a 
descriptive exposition with detailed reference to particular amendments and developments, yet there 
remains a gap in relation to a critical analysis geared at suggesting design improvements for similar 
reforms in the future.
147
  
A recent contribution in this area has been the comparative analysis of the Belgian and Italian ACE-
variants by Zangari,
148
 who presents the case for why the design of the Italian ACE-variant allows for 
a more robust reform than the Belgian NID; namely, due to its anti-avoidance framework. However, 
Zangari refers to the Belgian and Italian ACE-variants as “opposite reference points”,149 which is 
contrary to the description provided by De Mooij and Devereux; specifically, that these two ACE-
variants are the closest to the theoretical ACE.
150
 Further, despite providing a comparison between the 
technical aspects of these ACE-variants in practice, Zangari does not provide an in-depth legal 
analysis.  
Accordingly, there remains scope in the literature to provide a more thorough comparative analysis, 
with an emphasis on legislative drafting and underlying policy intentions for amendments over time 
coupled with a good tax design principle assessment. This is the focus of further research by the 
author. Another aspect of the ACE that has received little attention in the literature to date is that 
ACE-based reforms have potential to be applied as part of a broader anti-avoidance framework. It is 
plausible that this would be particularly useful when dealing with cross-border issues.
151
 Subsequent 
research by the author will explore the relationship between the ACE and cross-border anti-avoidance 
rules in practice from a legal perspective, which is a current gap in the literature. 
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The studies providing assessments of ACE-variants in practice tend to be focussed on the cost of 
capital,
152
 the company tax rate with respect to the pre-existing and subsequent systems,
153
 and the 
effect of tax incentives on firms’ capital structure.154 Several simulation studies have been conducted 
by leading commentators such as Keuschnigg and Dietz,
155
 Radulescu and Stimmelmayr,
156
  Fehr and 
Wiegard,
157
 and De Mooij and Devereux.
158
  
However, research on these ACE-variants is inconclusive. In relation to the Belgian NID, econometric 
evidence on SMEs financial structure
159
 ranges from the reform having no significant effects in some 
studies, while other studies conducted by the same commentators but using larger datasets finding that 
the Belgian NID does significantly change SME leverage.
160
 In relation the Italian DIT, 
microsimulation modelling conducted by leading commentators Oropallo and Parisi
161
 is limited in 
scope because the empirical results only consider the first-round impact of the reform. Even though 
the post-transition period planned on more closely aligning the Italian reform to the theoretical ACE, 
it was abolished merely months into this stage due to a change of government in July 2001. 
Nonetheless, the literature contains a useful comparison between theoretical ACE and the Italian DIT 
in both its early and final stages, extracted in Table 4 below.
162
 Bordignon et al observe that the 1998 
version of the Italian DIT contained provisions to assist in the regime’s transition to the ‘final regime’. 
They explain that this final regime differs from both the theoretical ACE and the reforms introduced 
in the Nordic countries at the beginning of the 1990s (Nordic DIT) in that the final regime is an 
attempt to balance conflicting tax reform goals. They observe that this results in a reform halfway 
between the theoretical ACE
163
 and the Nordic DIT.
164
 As shown in Table 4 below, the final regime 
includes an ACE-inspired tax on above-normal income (expressed as ‘Ʈ(Π – rE)’) but it also taxes the 
ordinary return (‘t*r*E’). This attempts to balance the policy objective of attaining efficiency with the 
budgetary pressures that resulted from reducing the statutory tax rate in response to increased 
international tax competition. 
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Table 4 
 
The following sections provide a synthesis of both the Belgian and the Italian ACE-variants, 
examining both the English-language and the accessible foreign-language literature. A detailed 
longitudinal legal analysis of these ACE-variants will be conducted in further research by the author. 
3.2.1.2 Effectiveness in practice 
Leading commentators observe that the Italian DIT was a restricted version of an ACE system,
165
 
whereas it is arguable that both the Belgian NID and the Italian ACE share the main characteristics of 
the theoretical ACE.
166
 
In the context of both the Belgian and Italian ACE-variants, despite calls for a rate reduction and base 
broadening measures – contrary to the ACE’s base narrowing – the advantages of the ACE system 
were considered to outweigh the disadvantages
167
 and striving for neutrality between the tax treatment 
of debt and equity finance
168
 was thought to strengthen corporations’ capital structure,169 thereby 
improving corporations’ solvency.170  
In the context of the Belgian ACE-variant, it resulted in a marked increase in shareholders’ equity in 
2006 and 2007, due to capital contributions from both Belgium and overseas.
171
 SMEs were also 
found to have benefited from the Belgian NID,
172
 with companies decreasing leverage by 2–7%, and 
12% in the instance of banks. These results have lead commentators to conclude that the Belgian NID 
achieved its intended effect.
173
 Further, the reforms following the ECJ’s judgment in Argenta 
Spaarbank
174
 may result in more neutrality in the treatment of foreign earnings in domicile states – 
although this has not yet been specifically addressed by the literature. 
On the other hand, other leading commentators suggest that the Belgian NID failed to achieve tax 
neutrality
175
 and highlight weaknesses in the reform.
176
 They consider that the Belgian NID failed to 
ensure tax neutrality with respect to both the source of funds and the size of investment.
177
 However, 
this evaluation was conducted in the gestation phase of the Belgian NID. Also, this evaluation 
differentiated between retained earnings, capital gains and equity, yet equity consists of both retained 
earnings and capital gains. 
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In the context of the Italian ACE-variants, the majority of the English-language literature is focussed 
on initial comments on, for example, how the Italian ACE could favourably impact Italian 
investments carried out by foreign groups and descriptive commentary on the legislative provisions.
178
 
On the other hand, the Italian-language literature contains very detailed and thorough analysis of the 
legislative provisions and relevant explanatory memoranda and cross-references the treatment under 
the former Italian DIT.
179
 However, unlike the former Italian DIT, there is little attention in the 
literature on the trade-offs to implementation of the Italian ACE. Another issue with the Italian-
language literature is that the commentators merely identify problematic tax treatments rather than 
presenting explanatory case studies or suggestions for improvement, which would assist in policy 
development.
180
 Yet, this is understandable given the intended audience of these practitioner briefing 
notes. Even though the Italian-language literature contains very detailed and thorough analysis of 
legislative provisions, there is little emphasis on considering other jurisdictions’ ACE-variants,181 or 
engaging in a longitudinal analysis and evaluating economic and conceptual reasons for any 
amendments.
182
  These all signal gaps in the English-language literature. 
Overall, in the context of both the Belgian and the Italian ACE-variants, there is a gap in the literature 
regarding the more specific funding neutrality aspects of these ACE-variants and their suitability in 
the cross-border anti-avoidance context, which at present is generally overlooked in the literature. 
Accordingly, a detailed legal comparative analysis of the Belgian and Italian ACE-variants will form 
the basis of a subsequent paper by the author. 
3.2.1.3 No need for thin capitalisation rules? 
The theoretical literature generally assumes that if a fundamental reform proposal such as an ACE 
were to be adopted there would then be no need for thin capitalisation rules.  
 
Leading commentators such as Gammie observe that “ACE clearly reduces thin capitalisation 
issues”,183 so if domestic-level fundamental reforms such as the ACE were implemented then there 
would no longer be any need for thin capitalisation rules because debt and equity would be treated 
equally under the ACE. Other leading commentators support the proposition that thin capitalisation 
rules would no longer be required (or, at least, could be simplified) under an ACE,
184
 observing as 
follows: “the ACE makes thin capitalization rules redundant”;185 “the more symmetric treatment of 
debt and equity under an ACE mean that thin capitalisation rules (which guard against excess debt 
financing) should no longer be required”;186 and, “thin capitalisation rules are therefore not required 
under the ACE tax system”.187 This inference can be extrapolated beyond thin capitalisation rules to 
also include other interest deduction limitation rules.
188
 For completeness, this position has been 
challenged in the literature, with Cooper observing that “This is a bold claim, but it seems implausible 
… in a world with ACE but without thin capitalisation rules, Australia gets either less corporate tax 
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or no corporate tax”.189 However, this critique of ACE’s suitability as an alternative to thin 
capitalisation rules prioritises the design criteria of sustainability over funding neutrality and possibly 
assumes that most MNEs engage in international debt shifting. This position is contrary to the 
empirical findings of Ruf and Schindler who, as noted earlier [supra section 2.2.1.1.2] found that the 
evidence merely supports the proposition that, for the average MNE, there is no need to implement 
thin capitalisation rules because of their nominal impact.
190
 They observe that the mismatch between 
anecdotal evidence provided by tax consultants and auditors, and the relatively weak empirical 
evidence concerning all MNEs is attributable to the fact that most MNEs do not engage in 
international debt shifting. Rather, they believe that only a few large MNEs engage in aggressive tax 
planning and that thin capitalisation rules cause significant collateral damage by requiring non tax-
aggressive MNEs to bear the administrative burden of these complex rules.
191
 
A research gap that remains in the literature is an exploration of the inverse; namely, whether it is 
possible to address the cross-border debt bias by adapting fundamental reforms into the cross-border 
context to improve or replace existing thin capitalisation rules.  
None of the ACE-variants in practice were designed with the intention of being alternatives to thin 
capitalisation rules, nor has the literature yet examined the correlation between implementing (or 
reducing the scope of) an ACE-variant and limiting (or tightening) thin capitalisation rules. 
Accordingly, the author will test this relationship in subsequent research. Preliminary findings in the 
extrinsic materials already analysed indicate that there is a relationship in practice. When the scope of 
an ACE-variant is restricted there is a heightened perception on the part of policymakers that MNEs 
are setting up thin capitalisation structures, which provides the impetus for increasing the scope of, 
and tightening, thin capitalisation rules. For example, the explanatory materials to a 2012 amendment 
to the Belgian NID refers, albeit in passing, to the need to tighten thin capitalisation rules following a 
series of amendments restricting the scope of the Belgian NID.
192
  
 
3.2.2 Safeguarding the tax base 
Despite the theoretical desirability and practical effectiveness of the ACE, governments consistently 
conclude that it is not a suitable reform option predominantly due to revenue neutrality concerns. This 
is despite policymakers in recent reviews conducted by, inter alia, Australia’s Henry Review and 
BTWG,
193
 the UK’s Mirrlees Review194 suggesting that a more holistic approach to genuine reform 
ought not to be impeded by the requirement of revenue neutrality. 
While the ACE system results in a narrower tax base and therefore lower tax revenues, which the 
theoretical literature anticipates is one of its primary drawbacks, it is efficient to tax normal returns at 
a lower rate than economic rents. So, if individual countries were to adopt an ACE system in response 
                                                          
189 Cooper GS, ‘Implementing an allowance for corporate equity’ (2012) 27 Australian Tax Forum 241–271, 266. 
190 Ruf and Schindler, above n 57, 9. 
191 Ruf and Schindler, above n 57, 9-10. 
192 “Cependant, avec la perspective de la limitation de cette déduction, qui a déjà été concrétisée en partie par l’adoption de 
la loi du 28 décembre 2011 portant des dispositions diverses et qui est poursuivie par les dispositions d’un autre projet 
visant à supprimer les possibilités de report de la déduction non accordée en cas d’absence ou d’insuffisance des bénéfices 
d’une période imposable, sont apparues des indications qu’un certain nombre de grandes entreprises envisagent de mettre 
en place des constructions faisant appel à la sous-capitalisation.”: La Chambre des représentants de Belgique – Belgische 
Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers [House of Representatives], Project de Loi-Programme du 24 février 2012 – Ontwerp 
van Programmawet van 24 februari 2012 [Bill of 24 February 2012, Explanatory Notes] (DOC 53 2081/001), Article 139, 
96 (Belgium). 
193 “Australia, in the future, should consider moving the company income tax system towards a business level expenditure 
tax, such as an allowance for corporate equity, subject to further international development of tax models”: The Henry 
Review, above n 68, 42-43; and, “… full implementation of an ACE would not be possible within the revenue neutral 
constraint imposed by the Working Group’s terms of reference with the base broadening options identified in this paper”: 
Australian Government, ‘Business Tax Working Group: Final Report’, Chapter 3: Allowance for Corporate Equity, 
November 2012, 12. 
194 “Our recommendations are thus to introduce an ACE without increasing the corporate tax rate, to accept that less 
revenue will be collected from the corporate tax”: Mirrlees et al, ‘The Mirrlees Review: Conclusions and Recommendations 
for Reform’ (2011) 32(3) Fiscal Studies 331, 351. 
26 
to growing capital mobility, the resulting tax structure might be desirable from both a national and an 
international perspective. Since some rents earned by MNEs are internationally mobile, national 
governments acting in their own interest are likely to choose a lower tax rate on rents than would 
otherwise be optimal from a global perspective.
195
 Accordingly, achieving the appropriate level of 
taxation is therefore likely to require substantial international policy coordination. While this is a key 
setback, it is important to note that this requirement applies to many taxes to some degree. 
Further, there is an assumption in the theoretical literature that by exempting normal returns from tax, 
the ACE tends to require higher statutory tax rates to secure the desired revenue (and maintain 
revenue neutrality). This assumption most likely stems from Devereux and Freeman,
196
 where the 
increase in the corporate tax rate necessary to finance an ACE was estimated. This could be 
characterised as the Achilles’ heel of the ACE because it is highly unlikely for governments to 
legislate higher corporate tax rates for both budgetary reasons and also because, ironically, this would 
deter inward investment by highly profitable MNEs and provoke outward profit-shifting through 
transfer pricing.
197
 Further, leading commentators also recognise the down-sides in relying on the 
premise that the ACE reform would be revenue neutral through a higher profit tax rate, as this would 
adversely affect investment decisions of credit-constrained firms
198
 and lead to negative economy-
wide repercussions generally.
199
 
However, the theoretical literature regarding the necessity of increasing the corporate tax rate to 
finance the ACE tends to overlook an observation made by King, as follows:
200
 
“At first sight it might appear that a tax which offers such generous investment incentives 
would require a higher tax rate to raise the same amounts of revenue as under the current 
corporate tax system. A little reflection, however, demonstrates that this is not the case. The 
new tax base would imply the abolition of investment tax credits and grants, and also of 
deductions for interest payments on new loans and for dividends”  
Further, according to the Meade Committee report, there is no reason to suppose that the corporate tax 
rate would have to rise if the base were switched to a corporate cash flow base.
201
 However, given the 
period surveyed there was from 1964-1974, it is most likely that the partial equilibrium calculations 
are no longer relevant as “… the most important developments affecting business taxation since the 
Meade Report in 1978 have been the growth of multinational businesses and cross border ownership 
of companies”.202 More recent estimates of the revenue loss of ACE systems estimate reductions in 
corporate income tax revenue between 15%
203
 to over 30%.
204
  
However, it is arguable that the benefits of the ACE from an economy-wide perspective may not be 
adequately considered in these assessments. For example, in relation to Keen and King’s estimate,205 
some of the investment would never have taken place under a higher marginal effective tax rate. This 
suggests the revenue loss may be overestimated. Further, leading commentators highlight the 
literature observation that reducing tax on foreign income can advance both domestic and global 
welfare.
206
 Leading commentators agree that the ACE encourages further investment, economic 
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growth and welfare. So, it is arguable that those additional activities will in turn result in tax revenues. 
Admittedly, the precise magnitude of this potential is not readily quantifiable and is beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
Understandably, at the current economic juncture where tax base erosion and revenue base protection 
are key areas of concern for policymakers, it is more pragmatic to finance the ACE reform with other 
tax reforms.
207
 For example, leading commentators estimate that an increase in the VAT/GST to 
finance the ACE would increase employment and GDP, while recovering more than 75% of the initial 
fiscal costs in the long-run.
208
 Other simulation results indicate that introducing the ACE at both the 
corporate and non-corporate levels (accompanied by the half-income principle of dividend taxation on 
households) would provide significant positive effects for investment, capital accumulation and 
welfare.
209
  The budgetary cost can also be reduced by limiting the ACE deduction to new investment 
only, however this may not be entirely consistent with the theoretical conception of the ACE base.  
Accordingly, it is useful to examine the ACE-variants in practice. Chen et al,
210
 Keen and King,
211
 
Klemm
212
 and Massimi and Petroni
213
 have provided comprehensive evaluations of these ACE-
variants in practice, concluding that ACE-variants were quite successful in practice and did not have 
significant negative effects on corporate tax revenues.
214
  Importantly, these leading commentators 
also observe that, of the ACE-variants no longer in operation, their abolition was attributable to 
political aspirations and the willingness of governments to introduce lower overall corporate tax rates, 
rather than to any fundamental design flaws in the ACE-variant system. The exception is the recent 
abolition of the Latvian ACE-variant which, at time of writing, the literature is silent on. Yet, an 
appendix to a recent European Commission document confirms the Latvian ACE was abolished “to 
compensate for a potential loss of tax revenues”.215   
Even though the adoption of an ACE generally results in revenue losses, commentators agree that 
“ACE passed its first practical test”216 and the IMF suggests that transitional provisions can be 
designed to limit these losses.
217
 To provide a more holistic evaluation it is also necessary to consider 
the flow-on benefits of the ACE in practice, such as investment, economic growth and employment. 
3.2.2.1 The revenue base and the “equity” base 
One of the most substantial hurdles to implementing the ACE is the political aversion to non-revenue 
neutral reform. Budget constraints were at the forefront of both Belgian and Italian policymakers 
concerns when considering implementation of the ACE. 
In the context of the Italian ACE, the government decided not to extend the calculation of “equity” to 
the entire equity stock mostly for revenue base protection reasons. This was despite their belief that 
extending the calculation of equity to the entire equity stock would eliminate the remaining tax 
advantage of debt, and would likely benefit the financial soundness of firms and their ability to 
finance medium and long-term investments.
218
 Further, with an estimated cost of €4 billion (i.e. about 
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0.25% of GDP) this would have been affordable.
219
 
The literature similarly reflects substantial criticism being directed at the Belgian NID as it is thought 
to have placed a considerable cost on public finances, and that the revenue foregone failed to boost 
the economy and did not serve any employment objective.
220
 Given the unfortunate timing leading to 
implementation of the Belgian NID coinciding with the GFC, there is increasing political pressure to 
abolish the NID on the basis that MNEs significantly (and disproportionately) benefit from it. 
However, macroeconomic analysis shows that the Belgian NID had only a limited negative effect on 
corporation tax revenues, if any.
221
 This is in contrast to the earlier empirical estimates from Keen and 
King that corporate tax revenue losses would exceed 30%,
222
 with the most recent approximations by 
Sørensen at 10% of corporate tax revenues.
223
 Assuming that inflows of foreign capital have expanded 
the corporation tax base in Belgium, it is plausible that the introduction of the Belgian NID may have 
even had a positive impact on public finances.
224
 Further, empirical evidence shows that the 
introduction of the Belgian NID generated substantial dynamic effects, bringing the gross tax 
advantage for companies to €3,035 million by the end of 2006, €1.2 million higher than simulation 
estimates.
225
 
Interestingly, in the context of both the Belgian and the Italian ACE-variants, implementation of the 
ACE appears to have been a last-resort solution. To provide a more holistic evaluation it is also 
necessary to consider the flow-on benefits of the ACE in practice, such as investment, economic 
growth and employment. 
Regarding investment and economic growth, leading commentators indicate that the Belgian NID had 
an undeniably considerable impact in terms of financial flows.
226
 Regarding the Belgian NID’s impact 
on the real economy, it seems to have been fairly limited in the short term, but it may become more 
noticeable in the medium term.
227
 In terms of employment, Burggraeve et al also consider that the 
post-coordination centre regime decline in employment would have been larger without the 
introduction of the Belgian NID. They indicate that in the new finance centres being set up by MNEs 
have seen a positive (albeit marginal) impact on employment.
228
 However, it is also important to note 
that it takes time for firms to increase their employment, so this result is not surprising.  
In its early stages, the Italian DIT was limited to new equity to limit short-term revenue losses
229
 and 
fulfil the public finance obligations within the EU.
230
 It was later subject to changes mainly aimed at 
accelerating its application,
231
 which aligned the Italian DIT closer to the theoretical ACE. 
Specifically, a multiplier which enabled normal profits to be computed on the enterprise’s entire 
capital stock rather than on capital increases was utilised.
232
 The reason for the introduction and 
gradual increase of the multiplier was due to balance the conflicting aims of complying with Italy’s 
public finance obligations under the European Monetary Union process
233
 while also accelerating the 
application of the Italian DIT.  
However, as seen in the Belgian NID, when the equity base of the ACE is aligned to the theoretical 
ideal there is scope for criticism on the basis that companies did not need to generate new investments 
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to benefit from the ACE.
234
 A popular alternative to the formulation of the “adjusted” equity 
balance
235
 is to use retained earnings.
236
 While this would encourage reinvestment and be effective in 
countries with high corporate tax rates,
237
 the English-language literature is silent on the legal issues 
relevant to this alternative, which will be explored by the author in subsequent research. Despite its 
digression from the theoretical ideal, the Italian ACE literature suggests that the use of an incremental 
equity base results in a more robust system in practice.
238
 
3.2.2.2 Political controversy and legal uncertainty 
Both the Belgian and the Italian ACE-variants have been subject to much political controversy 
following criticisms that the ACE reform disproportionately benefits MNEs and presents a substantial 
tax leak. This resulted in a plethora of legislative amendments which in turn has exacerbated concerns 
surrounding legal certainty. This raises one of the key issues in practice; it is difficult to create enough 
simplicity to give businesses a feeling of legal certainty about fundamental reform while instilling the 
voting public’s confidence in said reform.239 
Since its inception, the Belgian NID has been the subject of debate on whether it should be 
abolished,
240
 with political controversy regarding its economic benefits, effectiveness, costs and legal 
validity. Belgium has the second highest headline corporate income tax rate in the EU,
241
 yet the 
socialist parties were opposed to directly reducing the CIT rate.
242
 The Belgian NID was originally 
introduced purely on politically grounds. This resulted in much criticism of the motivations for 
implementing the Belgian NID from leading academics such as Vanistendael, who described the 
Belgian NID as “a prime example of what happens when you hold [on to] political and social 
symbols”.243 Vanistendael considers that policymakers could have increased tobacco and alcohol 
taxes, or increased the VAT instead of implementing an ACE-variant. 
Similarly, in the Italian context, the implementation of two ACE-variants, with one abolished 
following a change in government, within the past decade exemplifies the highly controversial nature 
of the ACE reform. 
While there are many issues within this area, the focus of this section is two-fold; first, reviewing the 
literature in relation to the implications for SMEs; and second, examining the difficulties in assessing 
the long-term benefits of the ACE in practice. 
Regarding the Italian DIT, the empirical evidence regarding its impact on SMEs is ambiguous, with 
contradictory evidence emerging from the literature.
244
 On one hand, the first ex-post evaluation of the 
Italian DIT found that tax reductions were not obtained by SMEs. This evaluation observed that the 
                                                          
234 Princen, above n 111. 
235 Specifically, shareholders’ equity is reduced by (i) the net tax value of the company’s own shares; (ii) financial fixed 
assets consisting of participating interests and other equity; (iii) shares issued by investment companies whose income, if 
any, is deductible as finally taxed income; (iv) net book value attributed to permanent establishments or immovable property 
located abroad; (v) net book value of assets which are unreasonably in excess of business needs; (vi) the book value of asset 
items held as an investment but that are not destined to generate regular income; (vii) the book value of property used for 
private purposes; (viii) capital gains expressed but not realized; and (ix) capital subsidies. 
236 Poutziouris P, Chittenden F and Michaelas N, ‘Evidence on the tax and investment affairs of small firms’ (1999) 6(1) 
Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development 7. 
237 mac an Bhaird C and Lucey B, ‘Determinants of Capital Structure in Irish SMEs’ (2009) 35(3) Small Business Economics 
357. 
238 Zangari, above n 148, 45. 
239 Pompen E, ‘Morrelen aan notionele intrest nekt rechtszekerheid’ [2009] (October) Trends 31; Quaghebeur M, ‘European 
Commission Questions Belgian Notional Interest Deduction’ (2009) [March] Tax Notes International 1045; Van 
Campenhout and Van Caneghem, above n 152. 
240 Vanistendael F, ‘Belastingaftrek op risicokapitaal. De goede weg gekozen?’ [2005] (May) Algemeen Fiscaal Tijdschrift 
1; Belgian Chamber of Representatives (2008) Integraal Verslag 16-1-2008, Report CRIV 52 COM067, available at: 
http://www.dekamer.be/doc/CCRI/pdf/52/ic067.pdf; Quaghebeur, above n 239; Pompen, above n 239. 
241 Eurostat, above n 215; at time of writing, Belgium still has the second highest headline corporate tax rate. 
242 Vanistendael F, ‘Goed bestuur?’ [2007] (July) Algemeen Fiscaal Tijdschrift 1; Van Campenhout and Van Caneghem, 
above n 152. 
243 Vanistendael, above n 242. 
244 Santoro A, ‘Ex-post evaluation of tax reforms: the case of the Italian Partial ACE’ (Paper presented at XII Meeting of 
Public Economy, Assessment of Public Policies: Palma de Mallorca, 3-4 February 2005). 
30 
literature was unclear on whether this was because SMEs were slower to adjust to the changing tax 
environment or whether SMEs were simply more reliant on debt. On the other hand, subsequent 
research found that the Italian DIT mainly benefited new firms and less-well capitalised firms, rather 
than strongly capitalised companies.
245
 This proposition is consistent with empirical evidence that the 
partial abolition of the Italian DIT in 2001 (replaced by a decreased statutory corporate tax rate) 
harmed SMEs significantly.
246
 This strongly suggests that an ACE provides greater benefits for SMEs 
than a reduction in the headline corporate tax rate. Maffini highlights that some commentators have 
employed large datasets, including SMEs, to investigate the differential responses of firm’s capital 
structure to tax. However, the leading papers have come to opposite conclusions on the implications 
for SMEs.
247
 So far the effects of the Italian ACE have been limited. This result may be due to the 
lack of profits available to reinvest in particular firms, and also because of the relatively small size of 
the Italian ACE, which leading commentators observe must be sufficiently large and permanent in the 
eyes of businesses if they are to be effective.
248
 
The Belgian literature presents similar ambiguities. Even though the largest responses to changing tax 
incentives are found among large and new firms,
249
 empirical evidence suggests that SMEs benefit 
significantly from the Belgian NID. This is because the Belgian NID encouraged SMEs to strengthen 
their capitalisation,
250
 thereby providing insulation from economic difficulties. There is a plethora of 
Belgian media suggesting that the NID is of little benefit to SMEs,
251
 and therefore raises fairness 
issues.
252
 This is despite the 0.5% higher NID rate available for SMEs to utilise. Further, the literature 
also suggests that the Belgian NID is unpopular with SMEs due to its complexity,
253
 while 
simultaneously suggesting that SMEs benefit significantly from the Belgian NID as it encourages 
them to strengthen their capitalisation.
254
 
Even though the full impact of the Belgian and Italian ACE-variants might only become visible in the 
medium-/long-term, the predominantly short-term focus of politicians and the political decision 
process in general requires tenable results in the short term.
255
 This is a substantial hurdle to 
implementing and maintaining ACE in practice because a lengthier sample period is required to 
derive meaningful results. It is also necessary to bear in mind that macroeconomic modelling has 
limitations; for example, Burggraeve et al recognise that to assess the Belgian NID’s ex-ante effect on 
corporate cash flows it is necessary to know its budgetary cost, or more precisely a transfer of 
resources from the government to the business sector.
256
 However, this cost is particularly difficult to 
assess, since the measure relates to both new investments and entire balance sheets, thereby requiring 
an integration of accounting and tax definitions which is beyond the scope of their model. Similarly, 
regarding the Italian DIT’s impact on FDI inflows, empirical evidence shows a connection between 
firm profitability, productivity and investment and the increased use of the Italian DIT;
257
 and, on the 
other hand, other leading commentators state there is very little evidence that the Italian DIT 
encouraged FDI inflows.
258
 Commentators such as Bordignon et al suggest that FDI inflows are 
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stunted by the lack of infrastructure, the heavy bureaucracy and the inflexible labour market, rather 
than tax policies such as the Italian DIT.
259
 
 
3.2.3 Selecting the ACE rate 
The ACE literature suggests that the risk-free
260
 interest rate
261
 is the preferred rate for the notional 
return on equity (‘the ACE rate’). Leading commentators agree the best proxy for this is the long-term 
government bond rate.
262
  
However, the use of the long-term government bond rate can result in issues at both the domestic and 
the international levels, which the literature has thus far remained silent on. 
Domestically, the issues are two-fold. First, on a pragmatic level, if a country has a relatively 
fragmented or unstable financial market, there is no obvious choice for a risk-free rate.
263
  
Second, it is arguable that the risk-free rate does not necessarily reflect the actual cost of equity for 
each firm. Leading commentators such as Sørensen and Johnson observe that, “in practice, the ability 
of the ACE to eliminate the debt bias depends crucially on … whether actual interest rates differ from 
the notional return chosen to relieve equity”.264 This was the rationale for the US Treasury’s critique 
of the ACE system, which commentators such as Rumble highlight when rejecting the viability of the 
ACE. However, Rumble’s observation that “the ACE proposal is a detailed exposition of a dividend 
deduction scheme”265 suggests that he has arguably conflated the ACE with dividend deductibility. 
The degree of non-neutrality would depend on the size of the difference between the actual and the 
appropriate rate of the notional interest.
266
  Since a substantial amount of information would be 
required to set the ACE rate
267
 this may be overly burdensome administratively, requiring different 
rates for different companies.
268
 Nonetheless, a key counter-argument is that even if the ACE rate 
were set at the “wrong level” this would still be preferable to a zero ACE rate, as effectively provided 
under the existing system. On the other hand, some commentators suggest that the ACE rate could 
simply equal the interest rate paid on debt financing.
269
 
Internationally, particularly when dealing with MNEs, it is questionable that a domestic risk-free rate 
is the best indicator of a MNEs notional return on equity. Rather, a worldwide rate would arguably be 
a more suitable proxy. This has been overlooked in the context of the ACE literature, most likely due 
to the traditionally domestic nature of ACE reform proposals. A “worldwide debt-to-capital ratio 
interest limitation rule” (otherwise known as the “worldwide gearing ratio”) currently exists in both 
the theory and practice of thin capitalisation rules, whereby interest deductions on debt financing are 
denied to the extent that the proportion of a company’s assets exceeds the proportion of the group’s 
worldwide third-party debt to asset ratio.
270
 Leading commentators also highlight that this rule is 
inherently suited to international harmonization,
271
 which would also be compatible with an ACE 
system.
272
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Nonetheless, in line with the dominant suggestion in the ACE literature, Table 5 below depicts the 
notional return on equity (r
E
) under the pure ACE at the risk-free interest rate. Under a pure ACE 
system there is no restriction on debt deductibility (r
D
), so the cost of debt deductibility is effectively 
uncapped at the market rate. As explained above, it is questionable that an ACE equalises the tax 
treatment of debt and equity financing; rather, an ACE simply mitigates the debt bias. However, 
traditionally conceptualised as a domestic debt bias solution, a standalone ACE would not be a viable 
solution to the behaviour of cross-border debt shifting. In this sense, an ACE neglects the symptom.
273
 
However, if the ACE was used to supplement thin capitalisation rules (rather than replace them, as 
explored in section 3.2.1.3) then the result would change. Even though the notional return on equity 
(r
E
) would remain at the risk-free interest rate, the extent of debt deductibility (r
D
) would now be 
capped. This would provide partial tax relief for both debt and equity financing, thereby nearly 
equalising their tax treatment. This would in turn mitigate the impact of both the symptom and the 
disease, as shown in Table 5 below. This presents a more robust approach in comparison to the pure 
ACE, which currently neglects the MNEs behavioural response of debt shifting.  
Table 5 
 
3.2.3.1 The notional rate 
Some leading commentators challenge the traditional ACE literature suggestion that the best proxy for 
the risk-free rate is the long-term government bond rate, instead suggesting that the Belgian NID rate 
should reflect market conditions to enhance neutrality and growth.
274
 When the long-term government 
bond rate is used as the proxy for the NID rate, the latter will most likely be lower than the interest 
rate on debt financing. So, there will remain a tax preference in favour of debt financing. The author 
submits that this is even more problematic when there is a significant variation between the long-term 
government bond rate and the NID rate, as was experienced in 2011 with the Belgian NID. As shown 
in Figure 6 below, which depicts the Belgian NID rate since its implementation, with an additional 
row indicating the range of the 10-year government bond yield,
275
 in 2011 the long-term government 
bond rate reached up to 5.949% yet the NID rate applied to non-SMEs remained at 3.425%.  
                                                          
273 Cooper, above n 189. 
274 Høj J, ‘How to Reform the Belgian Tax System to Enhance Economic Growth’ (Working Paper No 741, OECD 
Economics Department, 18 December 2009). 
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Figure 6 
 
 
Under both the Italian DIT and the Italian ACE, empirical evidence shows that effective marginal tax 
rates have dramatically reduced. This is consistent with the ACE literature, which indicates that the 
tax advantage of debt financing can be eliminated quite simply by bringing the notional ACE rate in 
line with the long-term risk-free interest rate.
276
 
The Italian DIT applied a two-tier statutory rate; the lower rate (initially 19%, 23.25% by early 2001) 
for the portion of normal profits representing the opportunity cost of new equity financing compared 
with other forms of capital investment and a higher rate (initially 37%, 40.25% by early 2001) for all 
above-normal profits.
277
 A particularly noteworthy feature of the Italian DIT was that the imputed rate 
was set annually with reference to market interest rates on both public and private bonds, with scope 
to raise the imputed rate up to 3% over market interest rates to commensurate for the higher risk of 
equity over debt finance,
278
 which seems contrary to the ACE literature suggesting that the long-term 
government bond rate is the appropriate benchmark rate.  
Some commentators argue that the tax advantage of the Italian ACE has reduced rather than 
eliminated the debt bias because the ACE rate was only half the market interest rates;
279
 in 2012 the 
10-year government bond rate was approximately 5.78-5.90%. Nonetheless, by early 2014 the 10-year 
government bond rate had fallen to 3.10-3.40%, and despite this marked decline, a larger ACE 
allowance was introduced under the Stability Law for 2014-16, which was applauded by leading 
commentators as a step in the right direction.
280
 For completeness, the Italian ACE literature has not 
compared whether the interest rates on debt financing have also halved. If they have not, this would 
suggest the continued asymmetric tax treatment between debt and equity financing, albeit a 
significantly less pronounced one. 
 
3.2.4 Phase-out of ACE-variants 
The 2004 repeal of the Italian DIT was attributable to the 2001 election. This political decision was 
criticised by some leading academics
281
 given the significant empirical evidence that even in its early 
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stages the Italian DIT resulted in a reduction in the debt distortion
282
 and a reduced cost of capital.
283
 
Admittedly, these results were based on accounting data rather than tax data, which would derive only 
a proxy of the increase in net equity eligible for tax purposes. So, there may have been substantial 
differences between net equity changes depicted on balance sheets and actual net equity changes.
284
 
The Belgian NID has been diminishing in attractiveness, and therefore popularity.
285
 Over the past 
few years, there has been increased media pressure and pressure from all sides of politics to abolish 
the Belgian NID. This has resulted in the Belgian NID becoming a 2014 federal election ‘hot topic’.286 
It goes without saying that the tax policy uncertainty from first implementing, then modifying, 
phasing down, and now considering the abolition of the Belgian NID erodes business confidence. 
While it remains unclear whether the Belgian NID will be abolished, leading practitioners agree that 
abolishing the Belgian NID would diminish the attractiveness of Belgium as a destination for inbound 
investment.
287
 Further, the literature does not expressly analyse whether the watering-down of the 
Belgian NID provisions – thereby marking a digression from the ACE literature – was the cause of its 
diminished popularity. This will be examined in further research by the author.  
On the other hand, at time of writing, the Italian ACE remains in operation with no indication in the 
literature of discontentment directed towards it. 
 
3.3 COMBINED ACE-CBIT 
Leading commentators De Mooij and Devereux have suggested a combination of the ACE and CBIT 
systems to maintain tax neutrality in relation to financing decision while also reducing possible 
negative effects of the pure ACE or CBIT systems.
288
  
In terms of economic impact, a standalone ACE narrows the tax base, increases the corporate tax rate 
(assuming higher corporate tax rates are introduced for revenue neutrality reasons) and lowers capital 
costs, whereas a standalone CBIT broadens the tax base, lowers the corporate tax rate (assuming 
lower corporate tax rates are introduced for revenue neutrality reasons) and increases capital costs.
289
 
It is important to note that, in the context of open economies, the ACE may inadvertently encourage 
profit shifting. This is due to the narrower tax base being accompanied by higher corporate tax rates, 
and a decrease in capital costs would attract more investment. On the other hand, the CBIT might lead 
to increased distortions of the marginal investment, with an increase in capital costs resulting in fewer 
investments. De Mooij and Devereux posit that a revenue-neutral combination of ACE and CBIT 
reforms in the form of the combined ACE-CBIT would improve economic efficiency by eliminating 
the debt bias. This suggestion has been cited with approval by the ICC, as it reflects a simultaneous 
movement towards limiting the deductibility of interest payments while reducing the tax burden on 
the cost of equity finance.
290
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A combined ACE-CBIT consisting of a partial ACE and a partial CBIT mitigates the discrimination 
between both debt and equity. First referred to in 2009,
291
 the combined ACE-CBIT has a substantial 
number of advantages; first, it was designed as a revenue neutral policy, and is also independent on 
whether the CORTAX model is extended to tax havens or discrete location choices.
292
 Further, 
economic analysis shows that moving to the combined ACE-CBIT could potentially bring substantial 
benefits in terms of reducing leverage, reducing systemic risk and reducing profit-shifting,
293
 by 
bringing the amount of interest close to its efficient level.
294
 Finally, empirical estimates suggest that 
the combined ACE-CBIT would raise welfare by 0.3% of GDP due to the more neutral tax treatment 
of debt and equity.
295
 Although relatively new to the literature, there is persuasive empirical evidence 
suggesting that the combined ACE-CBIT would expand welfare due to its more efficient financial 
structure.
296
 
However, the combined ACE-CBIT has not yet been analysed in detail by the literature;
297
 for 
example, in Australia, recommendations for reform have featured detailed analysis of the ACE, ACC, 
CBIT and DIT – entirely omitting the combined ACE-CBIT.298 
Accordingly, there are significant gaps in the combined ACE-CBIT literature. The focus of 
subsequent research by the author will be examining whether a cross-border combined ACE-CBIT 
would be a viable alternative to thin capitalisation rules. This aspect remains understudied in 
literature. 
 
3.3.1 Cross-border ACE-CBIT: An alternative to thin capitalisation rules? 
A combined ACE-CBIT applicable only in the cross-border context (‘cross-border ACE-CBIT’) has 
not been contemplated by the literature to date.  
An equal allowable deduction for both the cost of debt and equity financing in place of existing thin 
capitalisation rules is arguably a more effective and robust approach to eliminating the debt distortion 
in the cross-border context. The cross-border ACE-CBIT can be designed to minimise the tax revenue 
cost. This is demonstrated in Figure 7 below, where a particular same level of gearing generates a $16 
million tax deduction under a cross-border ACE-CBIT, a $36 million tax deduction under thin 
capitalisation rules. It is important to note that 4% is a reasonable proxy for the risk-free rate, as the 
10-year Australian Government bonds currently have yields around this level. Further, by applying 
equally to both debt and equity financing, the cross-border ACE-CBIT makes the debt and equity 
rules surrounding the existing thin capitalisation regime redundant, thereby simplifying this area of 
tax law. 
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Figure 7 
 
3.4 ALLOWANCE FOR CORPORATE CAPITAL 
There exists an extensive ACC literature, a thorough analysis of which is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Many leading commentators have suggested an ACC reform,
299
 which is essentially the same 
as the business enterprises income tax (‘BEIT’).300 These reforms contemplate an overhaul of the 
corporate income tax system – however the cross-border implications are largely overlooked, 
particularly the design aspects of international, transitional and anti-avoidance provisions.
301
 Indeed, 
to the best of the author’s knowledge, none of the ACC literature suggests replacing thin capitalisation 
rules with an ACC applied only in the cross-border context. 
The theoretical foundation for the ACC was established by Boadway and Bruce, who proposed 
abolishing debt deductibility and replacing it with an allowance for notional risk-free return to 
capital.
302
 A key advantage of the ACC is that it entirely eliminates the debt bias, unlike the ACE 
which only partially achieves funding neutrality.
303
 This gives the ACC the funding neutrality benefits 
of a CBIT without being as adverse to investments as a CBIT. De Mooij and Devereux apply 
simulations with the CORTAX model
304
 to quantify the trade-offs in ACE and CBIT reform in the 
European Union, the US and Japan.
305
 While many countries including Australia are excluded from 
the scope of this analysis, it may be possible to extrapolate these results to other jurisdictions. 
Since the ACC treats debt and equity equally for tax purposes it arguably has the same, if not better, 
economic efficiency implications as the ACE. Indeed, the choice between the ACC and the ACE 
ultimately involves a trade-off between the greater financial neutrality achieved under the ACC and 
the greater real investment neutrality under the ACE.
306
 By applying the ACC rate on the book value 
of assets, the difference between debt and equity becomes irrelevant for tax purposes, thereby 
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reducing complexity in practice.
307
 However, some commentators observe that equity would then 
become a preferred source of finance due to the possibility of capital gains tax deferral from equity 
finance as opposed to interest payments and dividends that are taxable on accrual.
308
 Nonetheless, the 
OECD suggests that this non-neutrality could be addressed with a “minimum distribution rule”,309 
which would induce corporations to distribute the COCA rate, be it in the form of interest payments 
or dividends. A weakness of the ACC is that, since it is a source-based tax system, it faces the same 
problems in an international context as its cash flow equivalents. So, this system may distort 
international location decisions and invite international profit-shifting through transfer-pricing.
310
 
While some leading commentators compare the ACC to both the ACE and the combined ACE-CBIT, 
suggesting that the ACC replicates a combined ACE-CBIT,
311
 this may not necessarily be the case. 
The ACC literature contemplates the use of the risk-free nominal rate for the imputed return, applied 
to the book value of capital (r
A
), irrespective of its source of finance.
312
 This would effectively provide 
partial tax relief for both debt and equity financing, thereby equalising their tax treatment. So, the 
ACC would eliminate the debt bias and mitigate the behaviour of debt shifting. By equalising the tax 
treatment between debt and equity financing, the ACC goes one step further than the ‘ACE plus thin 
capitalisation rules’ alternative explored in section 3.2.3.  
On the other hand, a combined ACE-CBIT is specifically designed to apply a partial tax deduction for 
the cost of both debt and equity financing. This comparison between the ACC and the combined 
ACE-CBIT is shown in Table 6 below. Further, it is arguable that this feature renders the combined 
ACE-CBIT preferable over the ACC because of its budgetary advantage, since a reduced nominal rate 
could have a smaller impact on the revenue base. 
Table 6 
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4 CONCLUSION 
This paper approaches the issue of thin capitalisation from a novel perspective by conceptualising the 
cross-border debt bias as the ‘disease’ and thin capitalisation as merely the ‘symptom’. Through a 
detailed review of relevant issues and the literature, it explores the lack of funding neutrality in the 
design of thin capitalisation rules. As summarised in Table 7 below, thin capitalisation rules are not at 
present a second-best solution to the tax-induced cross-border debt bias. 
An analysis of fundamental reforms designed to address the debt bias is provided; in particular, a 
CBIT, an ACE, an ACE plus thin capitalisation rules, an ACC and a combined ACE-CBIT. The 
Belgian and the Italian ACE-variants provide useful case studies because they are long-standing ACE-
variants still in operation, they share a closeness to the theoretical ideal, and they are relatively well-
documented. However, there is a gap in the literature regarding the more specific funding neutrality 
aspects of these ACE-variants and their suitability in the cross-border anti-avoidance context. Further, 
while leading commentators support the proposition that thin capitalisation rules would no longer be 
required under an ACE, the author observes that there remains a research gap in the literature on an 
exploration of the inverse. Specifically, whether it is possible to address the cross-border debt bias by 
adapting fundamental reforms into the cross-border context to improve or replace existing thin 
capitalisation rules. This paper extends the literature by asking whether it is possible to apply one of 
these fundamental reforms in the cross-border context to attain funding neutrality. 
Table 7 below synthesises these reform alternatives, which were explored by way of both theoretical 
analysis and through the use of hypothetical examples. The most effective reform options to address 
both the tax-induced cross-border debt bias (the ‘disease’) and the behaviour of debt shifting (the 
‘symptom’) are those that either mitigate or, preferably, eliminate the disease and symptom. While the 
existing thin capitalisation rules and the ACE are the only two reform options to have been 
implemented in practice, this paper suggests that they are not the most effective solution. Rather, 
either a CBIT, an ACE plus thin capitalisation rules, an ACC or a combined ACE-CBIT are 
preferable when considered from the perspective of the disease/symptom approach adopted in this 
paper. However, a CBIT would be problematic from an international investment and competitiveness 
perspective, and an ACE plus thin capitalisation rules model would not equalise the tax treatment of 
debt and equity financing. Once policy issues such as revenue neutrality and international 
competitiveness are considered, the reform option that this paper considers best suited to dealing with 
both the disease and the symptom is either the ACC or the combined ACE-CBIT. 
Table 7 
 
The key research gaps identified are briefly summarised as follows: first, whether it is possible to 
address the cross-border debt bias by adapting fundamental reforms into the cross-border context. 
Specifically, whether a combined ACE-CBIT reform could be utilised to improve or replace existing 
thin capitalisation rules. Second, whether a thorough legal comparative analysis of ACE-variants 
could assist in suggesting design improvements. Third, whether there is empirical support for the 
proposition that MNEs are currently operating at the legal limits of thin capitalisation rules. The first 
two research gaps are currently the focus of ongoing research by the author. 
 
